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ABSTRACT

Bioterrorism, the use of biological and chemical agents for terrorist purposes, is one of
the most potentially significant health and security threats currently facing the United
States. Healthcare facilities as isolated entities are alone unable to provide sufficient,
adaptable emergency response options during a bioterrorist attack—an unpredictable,
low probability, high consequence event. Bioterrorism response must be systemic,
distributed, flexible, and responsive for a wide range of event incidents, scenarios and
contexts. A significant problem yet to be adequately addressed is the mitigation of the
walking well—those who are not sick or injured but have the potential to inundate any
designated response setting.

Architectural interventions alone are limited in their ability to provide an appropriate
response to an act of bioterrorism. An analogy to the human immune system and how
it operates in the body to overcome pathogens will be used to articulate a systematic
bioterrorism response and a series of architectural interventions for dealing with the
walking well. Similar to our immune system, a response network (or system) should
be created that operates throughout high risk urban contexts and takes advantage of
existing architectural settings in order to deploy as needed and where needed in response
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to a bioterrorist attack. An antibody response to bioterrorism must be able to adapt to
meeting the needs of various scenarios and contexts in which an incident might occur.
Drawing on this biological metaphor, any proposed architectural interventions must
include latent capabilities while having the ability to be activated in place and scalable
in order to accommodate the multiple potential threats and the many variables inherent
with bioterrorism.

The proposal for an architectural response to bioterrorism is situated in Washington,
D.C., identified as the highest potential target city in the United States for acts of
bioterrorism. Appropriate latent resources capable of acting as a part of the response
network throughout the D.C. urban context will be identified and their potential activation
will be explored through two example scenarios, which will be used to illustrate the
proposed model for systematic response. The most architecturally significant locations
for (activated) small scale interjections will be designed to meet the first response needs
of the general population who would be moving about in the city during the detection
of an event. These sites and features will allow for differing degrees of self-diagnosis
during and following an event as well as provide general day to day and event related
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public health information. The proposed architectural interjections will be designed
to respond to the predicted fear and panic exhibited by the walking well during a
bioterrorist attack, and minimize their potential for overwhelming hospitals and other
healthcare settings in the target region.
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INTRODUCTION

Bioterrorism, the use of biological and chemical agents for terrorist purposes, is one of
the most potentially significant health and security threats currently facing the United
States. Bioterrorism is an unpredictable, low probability, high consequence event. Any
response, including architectural settings for diagnosis and treatment must be systemic,
dispersed, adaptable, and reactive to a wide range of event variables. This thesis focuses
on a systematic response and specific architectural interventions for a significant yet
substantially unaddressed population that would present themselves in great numbers
upon available response settings and services—the walking well, those who are not
sick or injured, but result as a manifestation of panic. This population has the potential
to cripple existing healthcare response services that would otherwise adequately handle
most scenarios.

The original intent of this thesis was to establish an architectural model that provides a
kit of parts with adaptable, modular and mobile capabilities designed to accommodate
a range of episodic incidents, scenarios and contexts.

However, architectural

interventions alone are limited in their ability to provide an appropriate response to
an act of bioterrorism. The low probability, high consequence nature of an event of
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bioterrorism requires that an architectural and systemic response should provide both
latent and activated programmatic functions. A response to bioterrorism must be able
to provide a response throughout an urban or regional threat context that is flexible and
responsive for a range of event variables.

Throughout this thesis several terms will be used to define the nature of a bioterrorist
event—incident, scenario and context. Incident refers to the type of agent, either
chemical or biological, dispersed throughout an urban threat context. Scenario defines
the way in which an incident occurs—within a building or an exterior context, and the
number of people that might be impacted. Context establishes the range of location(s)
in which the response will take place. These terms will frame the conditions used to
define probable scenarios of bioterrorist attack.

The Threat of Terrorism: On September 11, 2001, the reality of a terrorist attack was
made known to Americans. Since then, high risk environments have been defined,
putting Washington, D.C. at the highest risk for attack. This thesis will focus on a
response proposal based in Washington, D.C. Despite the awareness of vulnerabilities
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within the United States post-September 11, significant gaps still lie between
emergency responders and healthcare facilities, therefore presenting the challenge of
providing a sufficient response for higher probability locations, and especially acts of
bioterrorism.

The nature of bioterrorism is that in any given location there is a relative low probability
of an event occurring, yet there is a high consequence of not being prepared. The
unpredictable nature of bioterrorism in terms of timing, location and scope remains
the greatest challenge to healthcare facilities and emergency responders.

This

unpredictability hinders the ability of healthcare facility planning and preparedness.
As a result, two models of an architectural response can occur—highly specialized
centralized locations, and decentralized models of response throughout densely
populated urban contexts.

Despite the unpredictable nature of bioterrorism, models of response are being developed
with highly specialized and centralized response facilities. During an event, centralized
settings are specifically designed to respond to terrorist events and other disasters but
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have the potential to be remote and inconveniently located from the event epicenter
and unable to provide an adequate response alone. During an event all patient flow
will be directed to these central locations—establishing a great potential for quickly
reaching capacity. An example of a centralized model is ER One, currently being
implemented in Washington, D.C. ER One is an excellent response site if an event
occurs in a location and way that can benefit from its resources. However, specialized
models such as ER One are expensive and unfeasible to replicate in sufficient numbers
and locations to adequately respond to the range of potential locations and populations
that may become targets of bioterrorism. Although the concepts and intentions of the
ER One project have been designed to respond to a great number of variables generated
during a bioterrorist event, this type of setting is economically difficult to replicate at
more than one location within an urban threat context.

As a supplement to centralized response settings, decentralized emergency response
options throughout an urban context have a greater potential to serve as first response
settings given the unpredictable locations of a bioterrorist attack and the real and perceived
health needs of the general population, impacted by the event. A decentralized model of
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response must be low cost, widely dispersed, accessible to all types of victims, versatile
and activated similar to the deployment of oxygen masks on an airplane. A response
capability is always present in a latent form. Once an event occurs a dispersed response
can be activated providing more immediate care to a larger number of people within
a response context. A dispersed response capability located frequently throughout a
context therefore must be relatively inexpensive to implement, and must be able to
serve a wide range of potentially impacted populations.

An act of bioterrorism would potentially place a great burden on emergency response,
including healthcare facilities and other medical settings such as clinics, to respond
effectively and efficiently throughout the timeline of an event. The most considerable
issue to be addressed in bioterrorism is the capacity of a medical response to handle the
unpredictability of patient flow: how many people will be impacted, where they will
present for care, and the rate at which they will arrive and need care.

Where patients will go during and following a bioterrorist attack is unpredictable in
regards to the number of victims generated, and where they will seek care. Both critical
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and non-critical victims will be produced by an event along with the greatest number
of people who will present at an identified response site—the walking well. Literature
reviews, first hand research and interviews with experts from the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), ER One, and other healthcare
facilities in the midst of preparing for bioterrorism, was conducted as a part of this
thesis investigation. This research established the limits of existing strategies, identified
gaps in response capabilities and established that architectural interjections alone
located within healthcare facilities would not address the most significant problem--the
walking well. Most healthcare facilities are generally capable of handling the demands
of critical victims during a bioterrorist attack. Even the most advanced healthcare
facilities are simply not able to deal with the potential total number of victims who
may present themselves at any given location when the non-critical and walking well
are included.

In order to allow the healthcare system and emergency responders to function, the
walking well must be identified and their needs addressed away from healthcare
facilities so that these settings can actually focus on treating victims with clinical
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treatment needs. Planning and response efforts should take into account the walking
well. Any response plan should aim to alleviate fear and panic by quickly providing
the general public with opportunities to determine their risk of exposure through
information and self diagnosis. A response dispersed throughout high risk contexts
must present multiple opportunities for people to determine the status of their health.
Providing the public with opportunities to gain a sense of control through information,
their interaction with an informative architectural response site or intervention of some
sort during an unfamiliar event can help ease the inevitable element of fear and panic.

Probable Factors: Potential bioterrorist attacks include a range of probable incidents.
Typologies of incidents include the release of biological agents, the dispersal of
chemical agents (typically in the form of a bomb) or the dispersion of radiation through
a radiological device. This thesis will focus on two example incidents—one chemical
and one biological. These two typologies are the most predicted and most obtainable
by terrorists. Each agent, chemical or biological, requires an inherently differing means
of response.
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Due to their ability to produce a more evident and instant impact, chemical agents are
weapons of immediacy. Immediately upon the release of a chemical agent, patients
will show obvious signs of exposure and will be in immediate need of treatment within
close proximity to the epicenter. An architectural response to a chemical attack must be
able to react to the immediate needs in a relatively concentrated area around the event
site.

Biological agents incubate within their victims often long before their presence is
known, making them weapons of delayed impact. Due to the transient nature of our
culture, many people work and commute within a metro area often utilizing highly
populated mass transit systems. A response to a biological event will unfold over a
longer period of time in a much more dispersed area because of this cultural pattern,
but may involve equal or greater number of patients than a chemical attack. An
architectural and systemic response must take into account multiple variables presented
within chemical and biological events. Bioterrorism is unpredictable; the agent that
will be used can not be predicted. Preparing for a bioterrorist attack demands the need
for a ready response for all types of incidents.
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Bioterrorism can be executed through many probable scenarios during an attack.
During an event, it is impossible to accurately predict all potential sites for the release
of chemical or biological agents, and it can be assumed that no building or location
is immune against the threat of an attack. Any architectural or systemic response
to bioterrorism must take into account this unpredictability and therefore be widely
dispersed throughout high risk contexts.

Existing high risk event contexts are simply not capable of sufficiently responding
to the potential range of conditions associated with a bioterrorist event. Healthcare
facilities as isolated response centers are not prepared to handle the delivery of care
to all potential patients that might present at any one emergency department during a
bioterrorist attack. At the same time, existing emergency responders are not prepared to
handle all the variables related to a bioterrorist attack. In order for a sufficient response
to occur, healthcare facilities and emergency responders need to be systematically
integrated and coordinated in their efforts.
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Metaphorical Reference: Throughout this thesis, a metaphorical reference to biology
will be used to conceptualize an architectural and systemic response network with
latent and activated elements. An architectural and systemic response based on the
principles of our immune system form the basis for the design of the proposed response
concepts. The antibody system is comprised of several types of components, always
present within our system, monitoring the condition of pathogenic entrance and attack.
During a response to a pathogen, the human immune system responds in a systemic,
dispersed manner in order to prevent pathogens from further infecting the body. A
systemic architectural response must be created that establishes a network of existing
locations throughout an urban context, programmed to respond based on a wide variety
of potential needs and the demands of the many possible locations, events, and types
and number of patients generated. A response network must be integrated and include
both healthcare facilities (where critical patients can be treated) and alternative care
locations (where emergent and non-critical patients can be served.) This network must
allow the dispersion of a response within an activated network—transit nodes and
iconographic locations dispersed throughout a threat region that people are familiar
with and capable of locating and accessing during a response.
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Architectural Intervention Criteria: Interventions must be designed to address
the characteristics of low probability, high consequence, and unpredictable terrorism
related events. Response sites and features should compliment existing resources
including healthcare facilities and should be widely dispersed throughout high risk,
highly populated areas. In order to be widely dispersed and located effectively across
large regions they should be low cost and have latent capabilities that allow them to be
of some use under non-threat conditions. These interventions should response to the
following design criteria:

Integrated Technology: Integrated information technology should be included to provide
the capability of notifying the public and providing continuous information during a
response to a bioterrorist event. This type of systemic response should allow mobilized
teams, comprised of medical staff, first responders and emergency response officials,
the ability to communicate and monitor activated interventions throughout and urban
context. Architectural interventions that incorporate integrated technology would be
capable of being activated (through a remote hierarchical network control center ) after
an event has occurred and a response is necessary. Latently, integrated technology
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would enable architectural interventions the ability to display pertinent public health
information (controlled by integrated technology.)

Didactic Awareness: Response sites and interventions should possess an iconographic
awareness similar to established means of emergency response (i.e. fire alarms distributed
throughout a building) so that public knows a threat is eminent or underway and that
they need to take appropriate action. Didactic architecture is an informative model of
architecture and an integrated part of the everyday which establishes an awareness of
response. During an event it is difficult to predict how the public will react, however it
is understood that the public will respond in a more effective manner if there is a sense
of familiarity with the location and use cues of the response feature.

Dynamic Response: A dynamic architectural intervention must be responsive to spatial
and strategic challenges presented during a bioterrorist attack. The unpredictability
of event location and patient flow demand that architectural and systemic features be
capable of responding in an effective and timely manner. Dispersing programmed
interventions systematically throughout a threat context establishes the ability to respond
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appropriately to the unpredictable nature of an event. A response to bioterrorism should
be capable of being activated based on the dynamic flow of patients over the life of an
event.

Response Program: A programmatic response will include the following elements:
Network control center , Public Health Information, Self Triage, and Wayfinding.
Architectural response program components must take into consideration that existing
healthcare networks can account for the care of critical patients—therefore the proposed
programmatic components do not need to include functions that are already in place
within a healthcare facility or emergency response system. For example, National
Metropolitan Response Team (NMRT), a highly specialized response team located
within the Washington D.C. area is already established to address decontamination
during a bioterrorist event.

The programmatic response of this thesis will deal

immediately with the walking well and potentially infected patients at a dispersed level
throughout an urban context.
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Network Control Center : The network control center is the integration of existing
response systems and proposed architectural interventions to bioterrorism; ultimately
it is a non-architectural connection between designed interventions and emergency
responders that provides continuity during the timeline of a bioterrorist event. During
a response effort it is imperative that first responders communicate internally so that
efforts aren’t duplicated and care is distributed based on patient flow. The proposed
network control center would exceed the current ability of emergency responders—for
example 911 (emergency) dispatch, by integrating more typologies of response (public
health, law enforcement, etc) that would have the ability to activate dispersed response
interventions throughout a threat context. A network control center would allow
primary responders to monitor post event factors such as the dispersion of an agent as
well as growth and presentation of victims impacted by an event. The implementation
of a network control center (through the use of integrated technology) is an integral
part of responding to bioterrorism that would ultimately facilitate the unification of
responders in a centralized location outside of the threat context, with the ability to
activate dispersed, decentralized responses throughout the timeline of an event.
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Public Health Information: Public health information would be conveyed through an
architectural intervention integrated into the fabric of an urban context that provides the
largest number of predicted patients, the walking well, with pertinent healthcare/event
related information. During the response to an event, information should be conveyed
to the public from one reliable source—the proposed network control center . Current
sources, such as the media often provide conflicting, dramatized reactions to current
events. The network control center would determine information that would need to
be shared with the public through architectural interventions. Latently, information
displays located at transit stops, nodes and along routes of travel would provide event
related public health information and be capable of providing information on a daily
basis relative to current health trends.

Self-Triage: The walking well should be mitigated from care locations by providing
opportunities for self triage throughout the urban context. Self triage would alleviate
emergency responders from having to directly care for the walking well therefore
allowing them to focus on critical patients. This form of response doesn’t currently
exist, with the exception of a telephone triage; the proposed system would be more
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dispersed and obtainable by a broader patient population during an event than the
current telephone triage would allow. A self-triage system would provide potential
patients with a series of questions assessing health conditions and determining their
health status and where they should seek care (if needed.)

Wayfinding: Wayfinding is the element of the programmatic response to bioterrorism
that provides patients, once they have received their diagnosis through the self triage
system, the ability to navigate throughout a context (which may seem unfamiliar) to
appropriate places to receive care. Wayfinding would not only provide victims with
literal directions, but would also allow responders and health officials to dictate the
flow of victims throughout a context by guiding them through areas which are safe from
the epicenter and more importantly distributing patients to alternative care locations.
Wayfinding establishes the ability to dictate the flow of victims to specific alternative
healthcare facilities; once a facility reaches capacity, patients would be directed to other
locations. Providing wayfinding to patients through an architectural intervention (as a
result of self-triage) would alleviate the demands placed on emergency responders to
provide direction to the patient population during an event—particularly the walking
well.
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Response Criteria: An architectural and systemic response to bioterrorism must have
some measure of its ability to respond during an attack. Throughout this thesis, several
federally tested exercises were studied to determine their ability to test an architectural
and systemic response to the fullest degree. (Inglesby, 441) All variables should be
considered in terms of their likelihood as well as the range of variable conditions that
they present. Exercises exhibiting the most significant variables have the potential to
place the highest degree of stress on existing response contexts, therefore presenting
the greatest opportunity to test a systemic architectural response. These exercises
established the timeline for which architectural interventions proposed in this thesis
would come into play as well as the framework for a systemic response throughout an
urban context.

This thesis proposal for a response to bioterrorism will be located primarily at a
dispersed level throughout an existing mass transit system—the Metro system within
Washington DC.

Specific architectural interventions will take into consideration

existing components within the metro system to be utilized in establishing a response
to bioterrorism. In addition, the urban infrastructure of Washington DC will be utilized
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to establish a dispersed, response network of alternative care location—existing
non-healthcare facilities that can be converted to care settings during an event. Two
typologies of events and the timelines that follow have been chosen specific to the
variables of chemical and biological incidents in order to examine the full capability
of the proposed response. One event will explore the immediacy of a chemical attack
with an epicenter located at the heart of tourism—the National Mall. This event is
smaller in scale, and the patient population is almost immediately recognizable post
release of the agent. The second event investigates the timeline following the release
of a biological agent. This event encapsulates a broader epicenter and a larger exposed
patient population, over a greater time period. The two typologies of events chosen are
different in nature, scope and scale, however both will test the capability of a proposed
response (and architectural interventions) to a bioterrorist event.
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BIOTERRORISM: INFECTING OUR SOCIETY
Bioterrorism Defined

Bioterrorism, the use of biological and chemical agents for terrorist purposes, is one
of the most potentially significant health and security realities currently facing the
United States. A strategic challenge of planning for a bioterrorist attack is that it is an
unpredictable, low probability, high consequence event. “Although a terrorist attack is
a low probability event for a single city or town, experts concur that it is not a matter
of if or where, but when” (Waeckerle, 254). A bioterrorist event has the potential to
impact a large number of people including the walking well. A response to bioterrorism
must be dispersed throughout an urban context and responsive to a wide range of event
variables in order to lessen the potential burden of the walking well.

Event Variables: A bioterrorism event has many variables including a range of incidents,
scenarios and contexts that need to be considered when designing response strategies,
tactics, resources and architectural features. An event is comprised of the previously
mentioned variables; their combined impact will be unpredictable therefore leaving the
outcome of an event indeterminable. The overall study and scenario planning for an
event must consider all three response variables and how they react with respect to each
other during the timeline of a bioterrorist attack.
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Incident refers directly to the type of agent dispersed—in this thesis, chemical and
biological events will be studied to understand the impact that their respective variables
have on both architectural and system-wide responses. According to studies, “the
perceived threat of chemical or biological weapons directed against the (U.S.) civilian
population has increased substantially” (Macintyre, 242). Variables of each typology
of incident takes into account the onset of an agent, the primary delivery of care and
treatment needed, as well as the ways in which an agent may or may not be spread
through (human) contact.

Scenario refers to the nature, scope and location of an attack including both the physical
location and the impacted population. Generally, a scenario can unfold either interior
or exterior to a building or transportation system. Also to be considered are the people
(or victims) affected—large, small or medium concentrations or dispersions of people
and agents.

Once an event has taken place, a response context refers to the locations where the
incident and its resulting response occur and where the delivery of care takes place.
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Treatment for critical victims can be established at one or more healthcare facilities
and/or at the incident epicenter during instances in which trauma has occurred and it
is best not to transport patients. Treatment of non-critical patients can be administered
at alternative care locations. Dispersed responses throughout an urban context will
primarily assist unsuspecting victims whose symptoms have not yet presented and
the walking well, those who may fear they have been exposed but again present no
Figure 1, NYC, September 11

symptoms.

1. google.com
September 11, 2001: Facing an unexpected act of terrorism, the American population
was awakened to the reality of a man-made-disaster during the attacks in both New
York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001 (Figure 1 & 2). This terrorist
attack had a fierce impact on our Nation, and as a result ”brought into focus the fragile
state of the nation’s acute healthcare system” (Hanfling, 128). However, “more than
two years after the unprecedented attacks on the United States the nation’s level of
capability for large-scale emergencies remains suboptimal” (Hanfling, 128). Many
healthcare facilities and emergency responders have begun to strategically plan response
Figure 2, NYC, September 11

2. google.com

strategies to bioterrorism, however a great number remain unprepared. Safeguarding
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the United States as a whole can be considered a challenge in part “because of its size
and scope, the nations’ critical infrastructure is hard to protect; then again terrorists
have historically not attacked it, preferring instead to go after targets offering high
symbolic value or killing fields” (Jenkins, 3).

According to the September 11 Commission Report the four cities, or rather infrastructures
at highest risk for an attack of bioterrorism include, Washington D.C., New York City,
Los Angeles County, and Chicago. Out of these four cities the Department of Homeland
Security places Washington, D.C. at the highest risk. The Commission Report also
states that federal funding for emergency response in New York (City) and Washington,
D.C. at the top of the current list (for funding). This thesis will focus on a response
located within Washington, D.C.—the highest risk location for a bioterrorist attack. The
proposed responses will take into account existing resources and capabilities within the
D.C.’s urban context.

The reality of the threat of bioterrorism is something that Americans are aware of.
According to research conducted by the Pro Research Center for the People and the
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Press “the American people are beginning to get the message; nearly two thirds of us
anticipate a serious terrorist attack on the United States using chemical or biological
weapons within the next fifty years” (Osterholm, 8). Despite the increase in public
awareness, in part because of financial limitations, emergency response and healthcare
facilities remain unprepared for this type of threat. Significant gaps still lie between
emergency responders and healthcare facilities due to the lack of coordination and
preparation between these individual entities. The challenge of providing continuity
between responders and healthcare facilities is still present and will result in an
insufficient response unless all potential responders become integrated in their efforts.

Unpredictable Availability:

September 11 established an awareness of the

vulnerabilities of our national healthcare and security networks. In its analysis of potential
terrorist threats, the Department of Homeland Security identified a range of potential
acts of devastation and defined the reality of bioterrorism as the most significant health
and security threat facing the US today. Significantly, “the conversion of commercial
aircraft into weapons of mass destruction transformed the issue of catastrophic terrorism
in the United States from theoretical to the gravely practical” (Hanfling, 140). Types
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of weapons (in particular biological and chemical agents) predicted to be used during a
bioterrorist attack are readily available and obtainable by potential terrorists. Predicted
weapons “are a viable alternative to conventional weapons for terrorists groups and
disgruntled individuals” therefore “this availability, coupled with terrorists’ willingness
to use these deadly agents, has created a credible and serious threat to the nation’s
security” (Waeckerle, 252). The increase and growing knowledge of the availability
of weapons of this nature by terrorist organizations has produced a more viable threat
awareness in the U.S. Despite the low probability of a bioterrorist attack placed upon
the US, “the perceived threat of chemical or biological weapons (directed against the
US civilian population) has increased substantially” (Macintyre, 242). Post-September
11:
‘Chemical and biological weapons have not been the focus
of domestic planning, unlike our long standing preparedness
for a nuclear attack. Today however, these weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) are readily available to many
countries…’ Additionally, ‘WMDs are a viable alternative to
conventional weapons for terrorists groups and disgruntled
individuals.’ (Waekerle, 241)
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The availability of weapons of mass destruction has the potential to produce unpredictable
consequences, and is a growing reality to the health and security of the United States.

Unpredictable Flow: The contingent threat of a bioterrorist event remains the greatest
challenge to healthcare facilities and emergency responders. The need for emergency
response including health services provided within facilities and by first responders is
difficult to predict making it hard to plan for an effective response over the inherently
extended timelines of these events - especially the release of biological agents. Variables
related to an act of bioterrorism are highly unforeseeable especially given the inability
to predict the location of an event, the spread of impact and the number of victims that
will be generated.

Healthcare facility planning and preparedness is considerably hindered by the nature
of events predicted to occur. The fact that “the single greatest challenge to improving
healthcare system readiness and capacity to handle large scale disaster events has been
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the irrefutable fact that such incidents are low probability occurrences” (Hanfling,
130). An act of bioterrorism is a low probability, high consequence event. Low
probability occurrences present a great challenge to healthcare facility planning and
preparedness efforts and this is compounded by the potentially high consequences for
lack of preparedness. Establishing the capability of an existing healthcare network to
be all risks ready for a low probability event is nearly impossible due lack of funding
and necessary resources.

Strategically planning for a bioterrorism attack involves many challenges of the
existing healthcare infrastructure, in part because of the inability to provide surge
capacity. Surge capacity is ‘the ability to manage a sudden, unexpected increase in
patient volume that would otherwise severely challenge or exceed the current capacity
of the health care system” (Hick, 2). During a bioterrorist attack, the number of victims
generated is unpredictable and the number of locations in which they will seek care
is highly unknown. Emergency responders will need to have the ability to react to a
wide range of scenarios at potentially more than one epicenter. Efforts to strategically
plan a response make “it is increasingly clear that disasters may ‘occur locally’ but the
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response generated is ‘regional’ in nature” (Hanfling, 129). Any response model must
therefore be distributed throughout a geographically broad threat context rather than be
concentrated and centralized to single, isolated urban centers.

Architectural Response: Despite the fact that a bioterrorist attack has many variables
and may potentially impact large geographic regions surrounding a targeted city or
site, physical and organizational models of response to date are focused in a manner
that establishes care in isolated and highly specialized, centralized locations, where all
patients are expected to present themselves and receive care.

A specific example of this is ER One (Figure 3) at the Washington Hospital Center in
Washington, D.C. Washington Hospital Center is located within a short distance from
the US Capital and is currently the major trauma center within DC. ER One is described
as an ‘all-risks ready emergency department,’ capable of responding to many variables
of bioterrorism. The intent of what will be a highly safeguarded superstructure is that
during an event within the setting of Washington, D.C. care will be delivered to all
Figure 3, Proposed ER One Response

3. Washington Hospital Center

patients within this setting no matter where an incident occurs—a highly centralized
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response to a very unpredictable, potentially decentralized event. The inefficiencies
of a single healthcare facility responding to a major trauma event was illustrated in
D.C. during Sept. 11 “of the 42 patients transported by ambulance from the scene of
the Pentagon attack, not a single patient was delivered to the Level 1 trauma center
(Washington Hospital Center) located 10 miles directly west of the disaster scene. All
ambulance transfers went to the two closest community hospitals, neither of which
has designated trauma care capabilities” (Hanfling, 136). Although the concepts and
intentions of the ER One project meet the treatment needs of the variables presented
during a bioterrorist event, it may in fact not meet actual response needs across the
larger Washington DC metropolitan area since this type of setting is highly specialized
and generally expensive to implement in sufficient numbers within a context.

In addition to multiple centralized treatment centers, emergency response capabilities
must be dispersed throughout the larger urban threat context. There are two basic
iconographic typologies of dispersed emergency response: limited resource, and
unlimited resource.
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Limited Resource: Two examples of a limited resource emergency response would
be fire extinguishers (Figure 4) or fire alarms (Figure 5). These small devices are
repeatedly dispersed throughout a particular context. In the case of the fire alarm,
once it is activated, a commanding network control center is notified and emergency
responders with necessary resources are dispatched to the epicenter. Similar to these
typologies of response, proposed architectural interventions such as self triage and
Figure 4, Fire Extinguisher
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public health information would be distributed throughout a context. During an event
they would be used by individuals at the event location and controlled by the network
control center. The proposed network control center would have the ability to notify
and dispatch emergency responders once elements are activated.

Dispersed Resource: The second approach, in which response capabilities such as fire
sprinklers in buildings (Figure 6), or oxygen masks in commercial aircraft (Figure
7) are widely available throughout the entire area. These systems are also typically
connected to a communication and or activation network. Unlike a limited resource
model, dispersed resource models typically do not rely on human activation, rather
Figure 5, Fire Alarm
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their response is often based on sensors monitoring an environmental condition. Once
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sensors are activated a small scale response is deployed at a dispersed level throughout
a particular context providing multiple responses to a number of people. This type of
self-activated decentralized emergency response has the ability to respond to a multiple
locations instantaneously unlike centralized emergency responses that require the
delayed deployment of emergency responders traveling to a centralized location.

An example of this typology is the use of oxygen mask on commercial aircraft.
Figure 6, Fire Sprinkler
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During an emergency event in which a plane may be losing pressure, a monitoring
and control system identifies that an emergency is occurring and oxygen masks are
then automatically deployed. This form of response allows a high number of potential
victims to be served where they are seated and immediately. In this case a dispersed
response, distributed throughout a context is more effective on a per person basis for a
range of event scenarios than a single centralized response capability.

Figure 7, Oxygen Mask
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Anticipated Patient Flow

The most significant issue yet to be addressed is the capacity of a response to take into
account the walking well—potentially the greatest number of patients generated during
an act of bioterrorism.

Victim Typologies: According to the ‘Severity Predictor for Mass Trauma Events’
Figure 8, Non Critical Patients
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(CDC) there are two major types of victims that will be generated during a bioterrorist
event – critical and non-critical. Critical victims, those that are either dead or terminal,
those in immediate need of care and those that are admitted on a delayed basis are
predicted to account for one-third of the casualties. Non-critical victims (Figure 8),
those that need less acute or minimal care are predicted to account for two-thirds
casualties generated during an event. The Centers for Disease Control also predicts
that patterns of casualties may double if the event entails the use of manufactured
weapons (such as fire arms), an explosion in a confined space, or the collapse of a
building. The most common misconception of existing resources and their ability to
respond is that existing healthcare facilities will be prepared to handle large numbers
of acutely ill or injured patients” (Hanfling, 129). Many hospitals can already handle
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critical patients predicted during a bioterrorist event yet they are not equipped with
the necessary spatial and material capabilities needed to provide care to all potential
(critical and non-critical victims).

Minimal additional architectural interventions

are needed to meet the needs of critical patients within a hospital. An architectural
response located within healthcare facilities is not only expensive, but it is impractical
to assume that architecturally the needs of all victims can be met within a healthcare
facility. It is potentially more effective and less costly to meets the needs of non-critical
patients away from the healthcare facility. To allow healthcare facilities to focus on
providing care to critical victims, the needs of non-critical and the walking well must
be addressed away from healthcare facilities. The greatest need for an architectural
response and capital investment is on addressing the non-critical needs of the largest
number of potential victims--the walking well.

Walking Well: In addition to critical and non-critical victims produced by an event
the greatest number of victims who will present during an attack are the walking well.
The walking well can be defined as people who will present themselves for medical
care both with and without symptoms consistent with exposure. During an event,
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people who suspect they are infected will greatly outnumber those who are in actuality
symptomatic and potentially critically ill. During the 1995 Tokyo subway (Figure 9)
attack by the Aum Shinrikyo terrorists, the walking well turned out to be nearly 4,500
of the approximate 5,000 reported casualties. It is believed that “for every casualty
injured or infected, hundreds more may seek evaluation” (Hick, 5). It is estimated
that the number of walking well may exceed the number of exposed victims by 5 to
15 times. The potentially large number of unverified victims who may show up at
Figure 9, Tokyo Subway Attack
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hospital emergency departments have a great potential to inundate healthcare facilities
and emergency response during a bioterrorist attack, and therefore provide the biggest
challenge to any response effort. In order to allow the healthcare system and emergency
responders to effectively respond to the needs of critical and non-critical victims, a
response must be designed to identify and meet the needs of the walking well before
they arrive at area hospitals.

Panic and Fear: Panic and fear (Figure 10) will be most evident during an event and
“the widespread terror caused by the use of (bioterrorism) weapons could complicate
Figure 10, Panic and Fear

10. Dan Hanfling

response needs” (Macintyre, 243). The general public lacks knowledge of the agents
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potentially to be used during an attack. Currently, there is little understanding of the
details of how biological and chemical agents are spread, what the symptoms are, and
what (typical) outcomes entail. It is predicted that the walking well will assume the
worst case scenarios due to their lack of knowledge.

During an attack of bioterrorism, panic can be reduced by “reinforcing the public’s sense
of control” through more obtainable access to self diagnosis services and opportunities
to remotely receive event related information (Glass, 3). Providing the public with
information pertinent to what is taking place around them during an unfamiliar event
can alleviate a great deal of fear and panic. A response that addresses the needs of the
walking well can potentially reduce the probability of those not requiring treatment from
inundating healthcare facilities—so health care responders can focus their resources on
treating those actually infected. Similarly a dispersed diagnostic response can allow
people to better identify their individual medical needs and take appropriate actions
rather than rely on emergency responders or medical staff who during an event will
need to be focused on administering treatment to critical patients.
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Predicted Incidents

A bioterrorism event can include the use of chemical, biological or radiological agents as
weapons. Biological and chemical agents are considered the most obtainable weapons
of mass destruction and will be the focus of this thesis. The potential impact of any type
of incident is immense due to the fact that “there is little or no ability to anticipate a
chemical or biological attack, little or no ability to detect one if it occurs, and little ability
Figure 11, Mobile Chemical Agent Detector
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to manage the consequences” (American Health Consultants, 5). It is nearly impossible
to contain an agent from spreading throughout an environment, especially those that
occur outside of buildings; therefore these agents are capable of spreading throughout
a context very easily. With the exception of a few chemical agents, most weapons
(chemical and biological) used during a bioterrorist event are generally invisible and
odorless making detection without the assistance of special equipment (Figure 11)
difficult. Chemical and biological weapons impact their victims differently including
the length of time before symptoms present themselves and the way in which an agent
is transferred from victim to victim. The delivery of care for each type of weapon has

Figure 12, Decontamination
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several variables such as the need for immunization or immediate decontamination
(Figure 12) as well as the type of symptoms that occur after the contact with a weapon
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of bioterrorism.

Chemical Incidents: (Figure 13) Due to their ability to produce an almost instant reaction,
chemical agents are weapons of immediacy. Generally, these types of bioterrorist
weapons are odorless and colorless therefore having the greatest ability to incapacitate
those that come in contact. Identifying the total physical area that may or may not be
contaminated is problematic as most agents are not capable of being detected without
the assistance of technology. In high risk urban environments technological devices are
assisting law enforcement and public health officials in the (constant) monitoring and
real time evaluation of air quality. Devices are located discretely throughout populated,
high threat areas, such as the National Mall (Figure 14), or Metro (transportation) system
(Figure 15) in Washington, D.C. These types of systems alert officials if a chemical
agent has been released into the environment at a higher than anticipated level.
Figure 13, Variables related to chemical agents

Chemical agents have the greatest ability to immediately impact the human body;
however it is possible for some types of chemical agents to take several hours to days
(at most) to become recognizable. Victims that have been exposed to a chemical agent
13. Personal Image

need to be immediately decontaminated before the chemical agent further infects their
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body. Due to the likelihood of traumatic stress that chemical weapons pose to the body,
a response should be activated and primary emergency care such as decontamination
should be delivered at the epicenter. It is important to remove the agent from direct
contact with the victim to limit its impact as well as minimize the exposure of healthcare
and emergency responders treating the victims. Delivering care at an epicenter allows
less severe victims to also be decontaminated and initially treated before they disperse
Figure 14, National Mall

throughout a context.
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The primary programmatic response to a chemical attack is decontamination (Figure
16) the process of physically removing (by washing) an agent from an exposed victim.
The process of decontamination includes the removal and disposal of clothing, a series
of showers that use a mixture of water and disinfecting products, and re-gowning.
It is significant to provide care at the epicenter immediately due to the fact that
decontamination resources available at nearby healthcare facilities would probably be
insignificant in size to meet the demands of patients (including non-critical, and the
walking well) predicted to present during a large scale event. Healthcare facilities
Figure 15, Transportation System
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today are typically equipped with small decontamination showers located at the
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entrance to an emergency department, a centralized response location. With the system
of response that exists today, after “the release of a chemical weapon in a populated
area, casualties may present en masse with little or no advance notification’ (Macintyre,
242) potentially inundating existing emergency response capabilities. By deploying
decontamination resources and capabilities at the epicenter once a release of a chemical
event has been identified, healthcare facilities can more adequately respond to victims
Figure 16, Typical Decontamination Equipment

who may need more sophisticated follow up care.

16. google.com
The release of a chemical agent can also impact the population located outside of the
immediate epicenter; these probable victims will typically not have an immediate
awareness of their exposure due to their location relative to the epicenter. Therefore,
the potential is high for infected victims to disperse throughout a context. Despite
difficulty of containing all infected patients at the event site, the further dispersion of
an agent is somewhat inhibited by the low probability of spreading a chemical agent
through casual person-to-person contact. Residue from the release of an agent typically
is present within a victims clothing but can not be spread to an uninfected person through
casual physical contact. Allocating treatment at the epicenter can minimize the number
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of patients dispersing beyond exposed areas during a chemical attack. The ability for
any response to activate immediately once a chemical agent has been dispersed and
recognized is significant because the symptoms will begin their onset within victims
immediately upon exposure. Treatment in the form of decontamination should occur
immediately so that symptoms do not progress unnecessarily.

Biological Agents: (Figure 17) Considering the ability biological agents to incubate
within their victims for several days before their onset and presence is known, biological
agents are weapons with a delayed but potentially larger and more prolonged impact.
Biological agents appeal to terrorists because of the inability to quickly detect their
Figure 17, Variables related to biological agents

presence, therefore allowing no trace of the initial release and source. Not only are
biological agents obtainable, they are attractive due to that fact that “in many instances,
these weapons are relatively easy to produce, inexpensive and can be deployed covertly”
(Macintyre, 243).

The potential for a bioterrorist attack to have a greater impact manifests itself in the
17. Personal Image

nature of our society. Our culture is very transient which increases the potential impact
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of a biological attack. Once an agent is released, infected people could disperse
without knowing that they were exposed, increasing the potential impact of the event
dramatically. People leave the epicenter infected, and traverse throughout densely
populated settings such as stores, airports, transit systems, schools, etc unknowingly
exposing those around them. An appealing aspect of biological agents is the probable
dispersion of disease through the mobility of its victims “the fact that the victims are
on the move, dispersing around the country or even around the world” (Osterholm,
71). Despite the possibility for an agent to spread throughout a geographical area
within its victims, most biological agents can not be transferred through casual contact.
In order for an agent to spread, infected bodily fluids must infect new victims; this
often requires a long face to face contact in a confined/crowded setting, such as trains,
subways, airplane, buses, cues at platforms and ticketing counters, with little airflow,
between an infected victim and a potential secondary victim.

The symptomatic conditions of biological agents and the similarities they share with the
‘common flu’ increase the appeal of releasing biological agents—medical staff typically
do not diagnose exposure to a biological agent until several days after numerous patients
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with similar symptoms begin to present themselves. Thus, “the only certain way to
detect the agent is through the eventual presentation of symptoms and then diagnostic
testing which will be retrospective for most casualties “(American Health Consultants,
5). Once an agent has been confirmed to the public, fear and panic will be exhibited
by the general population including those not exposed. It is unlike a chemical attack
where the epicenter can be identified and patients can more easily be tracked. A large
number of widely dispersed biological event victims will be generated because of the
inability to determine the definitive area of release. A response to bioterrorism must
therefore be dispersed throughout a larger context similar to the manner in which the
agent disperses in order to reach the highest number of potential victims.

A significant programmatic response to bioterrorism includes isolation of exposed
critical victims; however this is not the primary architectural and interventional needs
due to the fact that the majority of people who may seek treatment will in fact be the
walking well. Isolation can be administered at hospitals for critical victims and larger
numbers of non-critical victims can be held in isolation for observation purposes at
alternative care locations such as designated hotels, and clinics throughout a context.

42

In addition to the obvious need for isolation, the primary programmatic response for a
biological incident is diagnosis and triage. During triage (the initial stage of delivery)
it would be determined whether or not a patient has been exposed based on simple vital
statistic monitoring. Care varies depending on the degree of onset once a patient has
been diagnosed. Most victims are immunized and discharged unless their symptoms
have progressed to a critical stage in which case they would be admitted to a healthcare
facility where they would be placed in isolation. It is reasonable to assume that primary
care for non-symptomatic patients can be administered at alternative care locations
and dispersed response settings, allowing healthcare facilities to focus on the delivery
of care to critical victims whose exposure has progressed to the point of recognizable
symptoms needing treatment and isolation.
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Predicted Scenarios

Many types of probable scenarios could be executed with bioterrorism producing
a great impact on the population. When selecting a target, (bio) terrorists can be
reasonably assumed to target a multitude of location types. “In a terrorist’s eyes, the
higher the profile of the attack site, the more attraction” (Osterholm, 71). Potential
high profile attacks sites include transportation networks (Figure 18), spaces (both
Figure 18, Transit Network
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interior and exterior) in which large gatherings take place (Figure 19), as well as high
profile (federal) buildings (Figure 20). Despite these criteria, a terrorist may attack any
number of related or unrelated locations in addition to those listed above. According
to the United States Department of Homeland Security “attacks by international and
domestic terrorists have demonstrated that no location is immune (to attack)” (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 13) therefore safeguarding a specific type of
locations is irrelevant when establishing response strategies for a bioterrorist attack—a
response should therefore be dispersed and able to adapt to the demands of various
types of scenarios.

Figure 19, National Mall, Washington, D.C.
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The density of an urban context can be considered an ideal location for bioterrorism
because of the many probable locations for an event to be initiated. People in cities
are mobile—many commute to surrounding suburbs or are visiting from other places.
In regards to the way that we build cities, “vast spread out, and prosperous, these
highways, clusters of office towers, mega malls and suburbs, each feeding on the other”
(Osterholm, 73) make cities ideal targets for promoting the most devastating movement
of a disease. Any attack of bioterrorism would be exemplified by the high number of
Figure 20, High profile buildings
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people that could potentially be infected if an attack were to take place within an urban
context.

45

Probable Event Typologies
Any architectural and sytstemic response to bioterrorism must have some scale-ability
of response during the timeline of a bioterrorist attack allowing response efforts to
fluctuate with the demands of patient flow (or lack there of). Current technology
allows executives and officials the opportunity to illustrate and play out potiential and
probable scenarios and event timelines, either practically or virtually, and evaluate their
Figure 21, Mock Chemical Incident
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performance before, during and after their conclusion. By performing these exercises
(Figure 21, Figure 22) officials can begin to understand efforts necessary to establish a
strategic plan. The federal government has tested the capability of existing resources
during several national exerises. This thesis will adapt the framework and assumptions
for these exercises to Washington, D.C. and will set forth the criteria for testing proposed
systemic as well as architectural responses to bioterrorism through the utilization of
existing infrastructure within an urban context.

Prior to the establishment of federal mock-events, no exercise had tested how existing
systems would respond to an event of bioterrorism. Federal mock events take into
Figure 22, Mock Chemical Incident
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account efforts made by all possible players including healthcare facilities and emergency
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responders. During the initial events it was evident that no component as a single entity
would be able to handle full responsibility, therefore coordination was necessary so that
each type of responder could focus on responding efficiently. Federal exercises known
as TOPOFF (‘Top Officials’) exercises (Figure 23), set forth by the federal government
in part because the “people who would truly be making the decisions in a real event had
never had the chance to become familiar with procedures and protocols” (McBaugh,1).
These types of exercises allow key players the opportunity to see how things will play
Figure 23, TOPOFF Exercise
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out in a situation less stressful then the chaos predicted to occur during an actual attack.
TOPOFF exercises are considered to be “the most comprehensive and ‘real’ test of
local, state and national response capabilities ever conducted in our nation’s history”
(McBaugh, 1) and past exercises exhibited both weaknesses and strengths of existing
responders. Post event evaluations proved that performing these types of exercises
was significant in establishing and designing comprehensive, coordinated responses
between agencies designated to respond. Emergency responders were made aware of
partnerships and the roles that each one would play during the timeline of the entire
exercise. Despite the efforts being made by responders, many gaps still lie in the overall
response strategy because responders are developing individual plans that are therefore
redundant and not a comprehensive of the abilities of all typologies of responders.
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Timelines taken from Questerra, Center for Strategic and International Studies and
Biohazard News for two events will be used as a general framework for establishing
an evaluation of the proposed architectural and systemic response in this thesis. Any
response must not only take into account the ability of each responder as a single entity,
but more importantly a response should take into account providing a solution that
allows both healthcare facilities and emergency responders to focus on providing a
effective response. The major variables that can potentially inhibit responders from
reacting effectively to an event are the number and role of people who will need to be
seen in any one location. A systemic and architectural response to bioterrorism should
take into account the incorporation of various types of decentralized, activated and
deployable responders within an urban context external including existing healthcare
and emergency response services.

The two most predicted typologies of a bioterrorist attacks will be studied in this
thesis--a chemical attack, as well as the release of a biological agent. The events
will vary in size so that the ability of the proposed response will be examined on two
different scales in an attempt to illustrate the capability of the proposed systemic and
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architectural response. This thesis will also assume that the role of existing emergency
responders and existing networks of response will be present during a response. The
chemical event will assume a smaller number of patients in a concentrated area, and the
biological event will assume a greater number of exposed victims throughout a broader
context. Due to the response time difference and identification of chemical (immediate
response) and biological (delayed response) attacks, the timeline for each scenario will
vary. The chemical event will only last for three days, where the biological attack
will continue for twelve days. These two events are very dissimilar and were chosen
to consider the ability of the proposed systemic and architectural response under two
variable conditions. Despite the dissimilarities between the two events chosen to test
the proposed response (different agents, different length of response time, different
number of patients and walking well, and different type of response) both were chosen
because they are predicted to be the most likely type of bioterrorist event that may
occur. (Figure 24)
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Figure 24, Comparison of Scenarios
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Figure 25, Enlarged Diagram of Scenario
Contexts
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Events Scenario 1, A Chemical Attack on the National Mall: The first event study, a
chemical release (mustard gas) on the National Mall, is an outdoor setting. The National
Mall is located in an area of Washington DC where there are many predicted potential
targets of attack including prominent Federal buildings within close proximity—
including Capitol Hill (Figure 26), and the White House. The target site is a heavily
populated area, as the National Mall on a daily basis attracts many tourists. The urban
district surrounding the epicenter of this event contains many museums, and outdoor
Figure 26, Capitol Hill
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monuments. (Figure 25)

This event provides an opportunity to consider the ability of the proposed architectural
and systemic response to address the needs of a small event, with only 150 people
at the event epicenter actually exposed to the agent—fifty of which are diagnoses in
critical condition. The duration of the event will last for three days, and will require an
immediate response. The response context in this case will be located at the epicenter
and will utilize existing response resources including the National Metropolitan
Response Team (NMRT). The primary delivery of care that will be administered at the
epicenter would be decontamination. Critical patients in need of further care would be
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transported to a local healthcare facility by existing emergency responders. Despite the
delivery of care at the epicenter, people at the periphery of the event will likely disperse
throughout the urban context and be informed of the event through the activation of
architectural and technological interventions within the immediate context including
public health information, and self-diagnosis. Diagnostic capabilities can serve these
people who will likely think they have been infected in an effort to minimize mass
hysteria in the general population from inundating existing healthcare facilities as well
at the epicenter of the event.

This event scenario will be used to study how an architectural and systemic response
could activate immediately and serve a potentially high number of victims (critical,
non-critical and the walking well) within a short duration of time. It also illustrates
how existing resources (NMRT) would be integrated into the timeline of response.

Event Scenario 2, Anthrax released during an event at RFK Stadium: The second
event study is located within a large outdoor context that includes not only the stadium,
but the immediate urban context that surrounds it as well as the larger metro region,
specifically Maryland and Virginia. (Figure 25)
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This event tests the ability of an architectural and systemic response to react to a
large patient population. During the time in which the agent is released, a population
of 50,000 attendees is assumed to be at RFK, 10,000 of which will be diagnosed as
critical, in addition to 3,000 (critical) residents from the surrounding residential areas.
(Figure 27) The agent and the release are not identified immediately, and go unnoticed
for several days until patients begin to present themselves at local healthcare facilities
with symptoms of the flu. The time between the release of a biological agent and
Figure 27, Population Density Surrounding
Biological Event Epicenter

recognition can be a matter of days, unlike the immediate recognition of a chemical
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agent. The delay between release and recognition allows victims to disperse throughout
the immediate urban context (Washington DC) and the surrounding metropolitan area
(Maryland and Virginia); therefore they cannot be as easily and quickly contained and
identified as they can be during a chemical release. The delay in recognition will
inherently produce thousands of walking well; as a result hundreds of alternative care
locations (varying in size) will potentially need to be activated to prevent this patient
population from presenting themselves at healthcare facilities. The primary delivery
of care at alternative care locations and kiosks within the metro stations will include
triage. Alternative care locations will potentially provide antibiotics and immunization
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to diagnosed patients. In order to supplement care at established health facilities and
alternative care locations the primary architectural and systemic response interventions
proposed in this thesis will include sites for obtaining and disseminating public health
information, and opportunities for self diagnosis, including thermal scans and selfdiagnosis terminals at a dispersed level throughout the DC urban context. These sites will
provide an opportunity for potential victims and the walking well who have dispersed
from the initial epicenter to determine whether or not they have been exposed.

This event is architecturally and systemically significant because of the prolonged
timeline, and the high number of victims (primarily the walking well) that will utilize
the response. An architectural response to a biological attack will need to be able
to quickly adapt existing non-traditional healthcare settings and be able to sustain a
response over a prolonged period of time. Programmatic responses will need to adapt
to their inconsistent, unpredictable physical environments repeatedly throughout an
urban context. For example triage within a school cafeteria varies in configuration to
that provided within a large arena. A response to a biological event will be activated on
a widely dispersed level throughout the entire urban context, and will serve a potentially
high number of walking well over an extended period of time.
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Existing Response Context
Healthcare facilities are inadequately prepared to respond to bioterrorism due to a lack
of physical space and staffing as well as the inability to stockpile supplies. During an
event of bioterrorism, healthcare facilities are currently assumed to be able to “care for
overwhelming numbers of patients; manage shortages of personnel, medicines, and
equipment; and provide the security needed for crowd control, for the provision of
safety for healthcare workers and patients, and even perhaps for the enforcement of
mandatory isolation of contagious patients” (Inglesby, 443). The low probability, high
consequence nature of bioterrorism makes it impractical and financially overwhelming
for all potential response hospitals to become all risks ready. The reality is that
healthcare facilities are “an essential component of the emergency response system
and at the present are poorly prepared for such incidents” (Macintyre, 1). Inherently
hospitals provide concentrated urgent, acute and ambulatory care services and are
somewhat dispersed throughout an urban context but not in a strategic way. Relying
on healthcare facilities to provide care for all real and imagined victims is unrealistic
planning for such an unpredictable event. Any response to bioterrorism must also take
into account decentralized locations and existing resources identified, organized and
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distributed broadly throughout a threat context so that the greatest number of victims
can be treated.

Mass Casualty: Typical spatial and clinical resources within hospitals lack the ability
to meet the projected demands associated with a potential mass casualty event such as
a bioterrorist attack. There is a significant gap between existing resource allocation
Figure 28, Patients

28. dhs.gov

and the projected demands associated with all predicted mass casualty typologies—
especially the perceived needs of the walking well (Figure 28). Generally, localities
define a ‘mass casualty event’ as one with more than a dozen casualties; far less than
an intentional release could cause (Siegrist, 3). Most hospitals on a daily basis face the
strategic challenges of being ‘at capacity’ with a number of patients entering through
the emergency department that is far fewer than those expected to arrive due to a
bioterrorist attack. Healthcare facilities “lack the capacity to cope with an unexpected
surge in patients” (Glass, 4). During an episodic event, such as a bioterrorist attack,
hospitals are at best typically prepared for limited “mass” casualties. Throughout the
TOPOFF exercise healthcare facility capability was tested:
‘Even at the outset of the epidemic, hospitals were quickly seeing
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far more patients than they could manage. In the beginning, two to
three times normal volumes and later up to ten times normal volumes
were converging on health care facilities” (Inglesby, 4).

The impending threat of a bioterrorist attack has redefined mass casualty in theory and
the way in which actual emergency care is delivered in an effort to incorporate the need
for high surge capacity. Most hospitals, especially those within an urban context lack
the physical ability to grow and expand to meet the demands of the resulting surge of
patients during an event of bioterrorism. Response strategies need to expand beyond the
capabilities of existing healthcare facilities in order to meet the demands of all potential
victims of a bioterrorist attack. Response strategies need to include alternative care
locations such as schools, hotels, and arenas dispersed throughout an urban context that
can be quickly converted as appropriate to accommodate the predicted demands of mass
casualties within an urban context to serve as nontraditional healthcare settings during
an event. Traditional models of healthcare should take into account the unpredictability
of scope and location of an attack and should therefore be capable of extending beyond
the walls of a hospital in order to provide a dispersed response within an urban context
that meet the demands of all potential victim typologies during a bioterrorist attack.
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Emergency Response Options: Emergency Departments (EDs) do not have the capability
to provide emergency response options to meet the demands of all variables related
to a bioterrorist attack. Currently “the majority of Emergency Departments (EDs)
are not prepared for this type of event (incident) should it happen today” (American
Health Consultants, 95). It is impossible to think that all emergency departments will
financially be able to prepare and safeguard for all variables of a bioterrorist attack, in
Figure 29, Decontamination Shower

part because of the low probability occurrence of an event in any given location.

29. Personal Image
Hospital emergency department facilities are specifically inadequate for providing
response options during a chemical attack as, “many healthcare facilities are poorly
prepared for the decontamination requirements of even small scale HAZMAT
incidents” (Macintyre, 243). Typically EDs are equipped with a single occupancy
decontamination shower (Figure 29) located near the ambulatory entrance; this model
is geared toward industrial accidents and only capable of handling one person at a
time during minor emergencies such a single patient exposure to a hazardous material.
Furthermore decontamination while a necessary component of a chemical attack, is
not programmatically needed during the administering of care for patients exposed to
a biological agent.
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During a biological release, triage would be the most common programmatic function
delivered to the greatest number of patients. Typically EDs are equipped with few
triage bays, generally a number far less than what would be needed to respond to the
predicted number of victims during an event. The vast majority of potential victims
needing screening and initial diagnosis should not have to rely on seeking care from a
healthcare facility that would quickly be at capacity and therefore unable to deliver care
within an adequate amount of time.
Figure 30, Typical Mobile Response

30. Personal Image
In some instances, healthcare facilities are preparing themselves for a bioterrorist attack
by equipping their emergency department with a typically small scale mobile response
unit, such as a trailer (Figure 30), or shipping container, that remains dormant during
normal operations but can be activated or deployed as needed during a surge event.
These units contain shelter components (such as a tent) and medical equipment needed
to provide a response during a surge event. These types of response units are usually
equipped with temporary shower structures to provide decontamination during a
chemical event. Most of the equipment stored within these types of containers pertains
only to chemical attack response efforts; during a biological attack however, the shelter
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component stored within these containers could be utilized to support alternative care
locations. (Figure 31) Containers used to store equipment and supplies, whether trailers
or shipping containers latently serve as equipment storage; the physical structure of the
container wouldn’t provide adequate area to assist in the delivery of care when the
supplied within the container were activated.

During an event these units can either be used on site (within a medical campus) as
Figure 31, Shelter

31. NMRT

an immediate extension of a response offered by an ED or transported to an offsite
care location such as the epicenter. Mobile units would also have the ability to be
an extension of care delivered at alternative care locations, such as clinics, schools,
arenas or hotels—the type of response at these locations would depend on the type of
event. Mobile models deployed throughout an urban context during a response could
potentially alleviate pressure otherwise placed on hospitals by less acute victims and
the walking well. A response to a chemical attack may require that a unit be deployed
to an epicenter so that critical patients are treated before they are transported and are
immediately decontaminated onsite. A biological attack, primarily because of the time
delay between release and recognition of an agent, may require that a mobile unit be
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activated onsite at a healthcare facility or alternative location (school, hotel, clinic,
etc.) and serve as an extension of existing services such as triage. Factors such as scale
and type of event and dispersion of victim population will determine whether or not
mobile units should be deployed or remain at an established response location such as
a hospital. Other types of response can be activated throughout a context with minimal
human assistance in order to provide public health information, self diagnosis, and
wayfinding to potential victims, and the walking well.

Regardless of its activated location, mobile units need resources—electric, water and
communication lines to operate during an attack. Gaining access to these resources
when a mobile unit is activated at an existing facility is obtainable; if a mobile unit
is going to be activated remote from a conventional healthcare facility or alternative
care site, the same basic resources must be available for the delivery of care to take
place. Offsite locations where mobile units may be activated is hard to predict prior
to an event, therefore this type of response “may present logistic challenges, such as
availability of plumbing and water” (Hick, 6). Mobile units deployed to an off site
location, such as the epicenter, would be primarily used during a chemical event to
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provide decontamination to patients. Units deployed to administer decontamination
can not function without access to a water source. It can be assumed that deployed
units would utilize fire hydrants and have the capability to be hooked up to existing
or portable sources of electric power as needed. The availability of resources during
a response activated at an offsite location should be considered so that mobile models
are reliable and efficient in establishing a response setting.

Current mobile units must be able to adapt to the location in which they are activated.
For example, they can be activated in open plazas, parks and even on streets with the
assumption that road closures will occur during an event. During an attack a mobile
responses can function as an individual entity or as an extension of a care or alternative
care locations established as part of the urban infrastructure. It is unpredictable where
a response will need to occur therefore any component of response will need to be
adaptive to all potential environments in which care could be delivered.

Existing Emergency Responders:

During an act of bioterrorism current Federal

emergency response plans currently incorporate the capability of various types of
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emergency responders including fire, rescue, and law enforcement, emergency response
medical staff, local ED’s as well as HAZMAT teams previously mentioned in this
thesis. Emergency responders have the potential capability of immediately arriving at
the epicenter and to administer initial care.

Like hospitals, emergency responders can not function as single entities in isolation
and be capable of providing care to all victims generated during either a chemical
or a biological attack. They are currently integrated through an established network
of communication so that each component has an immediate awareness of current
emergency situations, and the involvement needed. For example, during an emergency
response in which medical care is administered, victims may need to be transported to
a healthcare facility. The emergency response network control center has the ability
to communicate with hospitals to determine availability as well as make them aware
when patients will arrive, and their medical status. Each emergency responder would
have a role during both typologies of event similar to the type of response that they
currently perform.
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HAZMAT teams (Figure 32, Figure 33) also typically exist within a response network.
This type of responder is activated during situations in which a hazardous material
may need to be contained, or removed. Similarly, they have the ability to treat victims
that have been exposed to hazardous materials. HAZMAT teams, by the conditions in
which they were designed to respond to, are prepared and heavily equipped to handle
variables related specifically to a chemical attack. HAZMAT teams also coordinate
Figure 32, Hazmat Teams

32. NMRT

a cohesive and communicative response with all components of emergency response
including healthcare facilities during a response situation.

HAMZAT teams are specially created to have the ability to provide decontamination
during a chemical event. A response that focuses on providing decontamination is not
adequate for a biological attack. Triage and immunization are the primary programmatic
responses needed for a biological attack. According to a bioterrorist specialist, “the
most important flaw is the fact that the HAZMAT model does not address the use
of biological agents,” more specifically “traditional HAZMAT products, such as
decontamination tents, trailers and isolation rooms, are expensive, require prolonged
Figure 33, Hazmat Teams

33. NMRT

setup time or are inadequate for large numbers of patients” (Macintyre, 243).
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During a response to a chemical attack it can be assumed that critical patients will
be treated at the epicenter by responders such as HAZMAT teams; yet it can also be
assumed that all remaining victims will not be treated and decontaminated by HAZMAT
teams at the epicenter. HAZMAT teams are adequate resources to specifically treat
critical patients—a much smaller patient population than the walking well who can be
more appropriately addressed at dispersed locations throughout the event context.
Figure 34, NMRT onsite

34. NMRT
Post September 11, provisions for emergency responders were reconsidered by federal
agencies. This includes “efforts to increase federal, state and local response capabilities,
develop response teams of medical professionals, increase availability of medical
treatments, participate in and sponsor terrorism response exercises, plan to aid victims,
and provide support during special events such as presidential inaugurations, major
political party conventions” (Heinrich, 5). The National Metropolitan Response Team
(NMRT), located in Arlington, Virginia, is an example of a federally funded response
team (Figure 34, Figure 35). Established by the Department of Homeland Security,
Figure 35, NMRT Resources

35. NMRT

NMRT is comprised of volunteer on call first responders (fire, EMS, law enforcement)
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and healthcare personnel. During an instance of terrorism (such as September 11) within
the D.C. metropolitan area, NMRT responders are alerted. Once notified, all responders
convene at NMRT (in Arlington) and dispatch to the epicenter or response location
jointly where they set up an area to provide large scale decontamination and triage. In
some instances NMRT is also deployed prior to high security events within Washington,
D.C. as a means of preparation for potentially high risk scenarios of bioterrorism such
as large gatherings on the National Mall, or political events similar to an inauguration.
NMRT is equipped with the necessary supplies to provide decontamination, as well
as medical resources and personnel to administer the immunization, and treatment to
a patient population larger than most local responders would be capable of during a
bioterrorist event including critical and non-critical patients.

NMRT was designed with the intention of providing response during worst case,
bioterrorist scenarios such as an attack during a high profile event in Washington DC
where large numbers of patients could potentially be generated. NMRT is an excellent
mobilized model of response capable of providing large scale decontamination quickly
during a chemical attack due to their ability to be self-sustaining without connecting
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to existing electrical and water resources. Additional response proposals need not
duplicate or overlap with the responsibilities of the NMRT to provide decontamination
during a chemical event. The NMRT must be considered as a component and model of
response during strategic planning for a bioterrorist event.
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Inadequate Integration
While certain healthcare and emergency response models may adequately respond
to the needs of bioterrorism in certain places under specific conditions, there is no
fully developed systemic response capability designed to handle the predicted range
of potential scenarios, locations and scales of events. One major flaw in a systemic
response strategy is that healthcare facilities and emergency response options are not
adequately integrated. For a sufficient response to occur during a bioterrorist attack,
healthcare facilities and emergency responders need to be consistent and coordinated
in their planning efforts and integrated in the manner in which they respond so that
redundancy does not occur.

Based on the fact that the “healthcare system is often operating at or over capacity daily,
we will never have the resources to be prepared for every disaster, but with appropriate
partnerships, incident management systems and a tiered response framework, we can
be prepared to respond to any challenge” (Hick, 9). Appropriate partnerships include
emergency responders and healthcare facility medical staff working together at a
localized level in order to establish a familiarity of responsibilities and a relationship
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prior to an event. During the Topoff Exercise new working relationships between
responders and larger national agencies were defined; ‘although hospitals and local
and state health agencies often collaborate with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in controlling an epidemic, (we) were unaccustomed to working closely
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Attorney’ and other major Federal
Agencies (Hoffman, 1). All types of responders must be coordinated; in particular the
relationship between emergency responders who will administer decontamination at
the epicenter during a chemical attack and healthcare facilities that will be receiving
critical patients from the epicenter is necessary. In an effort to assist in mitigating the
needs of the walking well throughout an urban context so that this particular patient
typology won’t inundate and seek care from traditional healthcare facilities, public
health information and crowd control must be provided through the coordination of law
enforcement and public health departments.

During an event all responders should understand their role and responsibility allowing
each individual entity to focus on their role in the delivery of care to victims.
An incident management system and a tiered to plan of action would establish a
framework for response efforts by allocating the accountability of individual responding
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agencies. As well as defining roles and responsibilities during an emergency, all
responders identified in a tiered response should have an understanding not only of
their individual responsibility, but also who they should be communicating with during
a response effort and what roles and responsibilities other agencies are accountable for.
During the Topoff exercise despite the fact that roles of authority were defined ‘much
time was spent in consultation and debate (regarding roles and responsibilities) through
scheduled (bridge) calls’ therefore decision making became ‘inefficient’ (Inglesby, 2).
It became very evident that during an event ‘a central location for face-to-face meetings
should be large enough to accommodate representatives from all agencies involved’
(Ingelsby, 2). It is also necessary that emergency strategies are outlined prior to an event
so that responders are able to focus on the responsibility of providing care rather than
trying to understand strategic framework challenges during the chaos of an event.

There is a significant disjoint between healthcare facilities, and emergency response
options. During the Topoff exercise Emergency Operation Centers (EOGs) were
defined by federal, state and local agencies prior to the event in an effort to establish
a central network control center ; during the response “many participants indicated
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that it was unclear how these EOGs would interact with each other, with hospitals
and public health officials” (Grossman, 1). Therefore despite the fact that a common
communication system was established, all responders need to understand the role
that a network control center plays during a response in order for efforts to not be
redundant. A significant problem today manifests in the fact that “healthcare delivery
systems, not to mention municipal public safety and public health agencies tend to
plan and respond to emergency events as individual entities, not as part of a larger
system” (Hanfling, 136). With individual efforts and response plans activated during
a bioterrorist attack, a response will not be executed successfully—each agency and
type of responder will be reacting in an individualized manner, and as a result many
efforts will be either be duplicated or neglected and therefore not provided. Prior to a
bioterrorist event “cooperative planning between healthcare organizations, and public
health agencies, along with the remainder of the traditional first responder community
including representatives from public safety and emergency management must become
a cornerstone in the development of any comprehensive emergency response plan”
(Hanfling, 136). A comprehensive response to bioterrorism integrates all potential first
responders and receivers so that their efforts and skills are coordinated successfully, a
line of communication is established and a viable response plan is outlined.
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A Systemic and Architectural Response

Bioterrorism presents many strategic challenges for a systemic response that must
coordinate the efforts between healthcare facilities and emergency response resources. In
particular, the most significant systemic and architectural oversight remains addressing
the needs of the walking well—victims who will present themselves for medical care
both with and without symptoms consistent with exposure. During an event, these
victims will greatly outnumber those who are in actuality symptomatic and potentially
critically ill. The walking well were taken into account during the Topoff exercise:

“By the end of the exercise, on hospital had (notionally) seen an
incredible 3,787 persons since the beginning of the exercise (only a few
days earlier. Of these, some 3,200 were ‘worried well’—persons who
did not truly have the pneumonic plague but were worried that they
might have the disease of be developing it” (Inglesby, 441)

Furthermore, the Topoff exercise ‘did not address how healthcare facilities would
distinguish between uninfected ‘worried well’, those with incubating or early
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symptoms of plague, and those with other illnesses’ (Inglesby, 441). A response must
take into account the potential of the walking well to inundate the healthcare system
by providing a programmatic response specific to their needs, dispersed throughout
any potential threat context and removed from the vicinity of healthcare facilities. A
systemic and architectural response to bioterrorism—an unpredictable, low probability,
high consequence event, must be systemic, dispersed, flexible and responsive to the
variables of the walking well.

During a bioterrorist attack the response means and locations for delivering healthcare
should be adaptive to the demands of the event variables presented. The delivery of
care must expand beyond the conventional care setting, such as healthcare facility.
During a bioterrorist attack “it is critical that the public understand that preparedness
does not necessarily equate to availability of standard medical care during a disaster”
(Hick, 8). Healthcare settings have a great potential to be isolated from the epicenter
of attack. Unconventional resources and response settings dispersed in a decentralized
manner throughout an urban context have a greater probability to better address initial
needs of triage, diagnosis and information dissemination.

74

The most significant architectural response to bioterrorism is not redesigning existing
healthcare facilities—they are not an ideal setting for dealing with the walking well.
Based on resources available today, “the existing network of hospitals probably
would not be capable of adequately caring for the people affected by a large-scale
bioterrorist attack” (Glass, 4). Healthcare facilities are best equipped to spatially and
programmatically handle the demands of critical patients. An architectural resolution
is needed at a dispersed level throughout an urban context in order to catch and respond
to the needs of the walking well before they present themselves at healthcare facilities,
and inundate healthcare services needed by the critically ill.

During an event, existing emergency responders (fire, rescue, law enforcement, and
responding medical staff) have the ability to directly assist in treating critical and noncritical patients. These types of responders must communicate with the established
network of healthcare facilities in order to provide treatment to those directly in need
of medical assistance. According to lessons learned during Topoff exercises, ‘to be
effective and efficient, response to terrorist incidents should fully utilize existing systems,
authorities and assets’ (National Response Team, 4). Furthermore, specialized typologies
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of responders (such as HAZMAT and NMRT) are equipped to establish a response
location at the epicenter of an attack providing decontamination, the distribution of
medical resources for emergency responders to administer immunization and treatment
to the critical patient population during an attack of bioterrorism. A response that
prevents the walking well from inundating healthcare facilities and response locations
(such as the epicenter or alternative care locations) is needed to supplement existing
response efforts so that emergency responder are capable of dealing with critical patients.
Response typologies such as public health information, self diagnosis, and wayfinding,
should be distributed throughout a threat context, and be capable of activating without
direct human assistance during an event so that the walking well are informed without
the immediate assistance of emergency responders.

Communication of response efforts and responsibilities between healthcare facilities,
and emergency responders should be coordinated prior to an event for a sufficient
response to occur during a bioterrorist attack. This coordination will allow healthcare
facilities and emergency responders the opportunity to be consistent and coordinated
in their planning efforts and integrated in the manner in which they respond so that
redundancy does not occur.
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ESTABLISHING AND IMMUNE RESPONSE MECHANISM
Biological Metaphors in Architecture

Biological references can be relevant to establishing an appropriate response system or
network and specific architectural interventions. A metaphor provides the opportunity for
something established to be transformed and translated into an abstracted interpretation
of the original subject. The use of (architectural) metaphors based in science provides
an abundant source of analogies and inspiration. In reference to architecture and its
relationship to modern science “is not the distance that separates the two disciplines
but, on the contrary, a closeness that prevents free metaphoric exchanges” furthermore,
“a productive metaphor needs an inherent distance between the terms that it links
together—the clash in meaning being the source of resonance” (Lerner, et al., 119).
Greater distance between the two subjects allows more room for interpretation when
(architecturally) executing a metaphoric relationship. For example, the process of
applying scaffolding to a building during construction or a re-constructive process is an
abstracted metaphorical relationship to applying a (skin) graft to a living organism—a
biological reference to the built form. It can be thought of as a reconstructive application
to an existing object however it is not a literal interpretation of a scientific process. A
metaphor based in science can serve as a basis for the establishment of an architectural
theory not necessarily by mimicking the form but the manner in which something
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performs. For example, the systemic response of antibodies can be translated to an
architectural response to bioterrorism. Antibodies and architecture are not literally
correlated and do not share a direct relationship. The manner in which antibodies
are dispersed throughout a living being, and more importantly the way that they are
reactive can serve as a model of systemic architectural response to bioterrorism. The
concept of how antibodies function should be applied to designing a dispersed response
to bioterrorism. This particular analogy should establish a correlation between how
the subjects (architecture and antibodies) are reactive during an unpredictable event—
a bioterrorist attack with any particular context, or an illness or invasion within the
immune system of a living being rather.

Establishing a metaphorical relationship is a process that abstracts something absolute
and formulates a conceptual idea. In this case the reactive process of antibodies is
abstracted and translated to establish a systemic response to an event of bioterrorism
within a physical threat context. The reactive conditions of antibodies and responders
to bioterrorism are similar in that they are unpredictable in size, and location. The
separation between their origination (science and art) and physical presence (internal
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and external), makes establishing a metaphor between antibodies and architecture easier
due to these differences. Architecture is not a static condition, but a dynamic process.
Similarly antibodies are not stagnant, they are constantly reactive. A metaphorical
relationship between the antibody system and architecture should be established to
provide the basis for the development of systemic network and conceptual architectural
interventions designed to respond to a bioterrorist attack.

Metaphor Typologies
Three typologies of metaphors exist: tangible, intangible, and a combination of the two
typologies otherwise known as a combined metaphor. A tangible metaphor creates a
strong, obvious connection between the analogy and the built form or its function. An
intangible refers to a less evident relationship between the analogy and the product.
Both typologies of metaphors are often executed architecturally to establish a purpose
and meaning behind the built form--ultimately the architect materializes the relationship
and role of the metaphor. Despite the fact that intangible metaphors are instituted
upon a less apparent relationship, both typologies of metaphors can provide a strong
relationship between the analogy and the built form when executed well. Utilizing
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metaphors provides the opportunity to communicate additional meaning in a new
context by translating and abstracting a known subject.

A tangible metaphor is a literal or visual metaphor that establishes a direct correlation
between the analogy, form and function. For example if you build a hot dog stand,
and adopt the form of a hotdog then people will recognize the function. The form is
Figure 36, Casa Batllo

36. architectureweek.com

mimetic of the function or in some instances the metaphor itself. A successful example
of a tangible metaphoric process is the works of Antonio Gaudi, specifically Casa
Batllo in Barcelona, Spain. Gaudi’s works were known for being organic, with strong
references to natural forms. His works possessed an organic language that was achieved
by abstracting natural forms. For example, the details of the window openings, and
balconies were very skeletal in their appearance (Figure 36). The Casa Batllo is a
good example metaphoric quality, exhibiting very strong visceral, skeletal and organic
forms. Similarly, the details of the arched roof of the Casa Batllo were likened to the
form of a dragon, or dinosaur (Figure 37). The works of Antonio Gaudi possessed
tangible metaphorical relationships to natural and organic forms and establish a direct

Figure 37, Casa Batllo

37. architectureweek.com

correlation between the analogy and the form.
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A tangible metaphor such as the one previously described, will not be used to establish
a response to bioterrorism. The proposed response locations (such as alternative care or
existing healthcare settings) already exist within the fabric of an urban context—their
physical envelope or form wouldn’t need to be redefined to be mimetic of antibodies in
order to respond to an event of bioterrorism. This typology is not relevant to establishing
a response to bioterrorism.
Figure 38, Caltrans Building

38. googlepages.com

An intangible metaphor refers to a contextual, less evident metaphor. An intangible
metaphor, similar to a tangible metaphor plays with the image of a form; however an
intangible metaphor plays on the hidden, discrete meaning of the subject or object. An
example of this type of metaphor is the Caltrans (District 7) Headquarters designed by
Thom Mayne and Morphosis. Home to the California Department of Transportation,
the primary mimetic reference of this building is that of motion and transformation.
Located in Los Angeles, this building is referred to as a part of the fabric of the city
as opposed to being a singular, formal object. (Figure 38) The skin of the building is
constantly changing. For example metal panels mechanically open and close depending

Figure 39, Caltrans Building, Moveable Facade

39. npr.gov

on outside conditions such as sunlight and temperature. (Figure 39) Additionally,
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the building materials promote visceral transformation. During the day the building
appears to be a solid mass however during the evening the façade transforms (because
of lighting) and appears transparent. Both of these systems integrated within the
building envelope are mimetic of motion associated with the primary programmatic
function of the building—transportation systems in an indirect manner. The Caltrans
building and its mimetic reference to transportation is an example of a dynamic
intangible metaphor—the building was designed with implicit systematic references to
transportation and doesn’t overtly mimic its subject in a static form.

For the purpose of this thesis an intangible metaphor will be established. An intangible
metaphor can further be defined as “those in which the metaphorical departure for the
creation is a concept, an idea, a human condition or a particular quality” (Antoniades,
30). An intangible metaphor will be used to establish a dynamic, systematic response
to bioterrorism comprised of conceptual attributes that are mimetic of the antibody
system. This type of relationship could also be referred to as an operative metaphor used
to establish a connection between the antibody system and a systemic and architectural
response to bioterrorism. A systemic response involves a series of components that
are connected by an overall system. Metaphorically similar to the Caltrans building
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and its skin that is active and responsive to environmental conditions, a response to
bioterrorism should be controlled by activated response elements such as public health
information and self triage linked by a communication network to one or more control
centers (based on environmental conditions). Additionally, a response to bioterrorism
should be active and adapt to patient flow—a response should not be static; it must
capable of a reaction dependent upon patient flow and demand during each unique
event. Activation of a response to an event would be dynamic to the components
associated with the event—type of agent used, number of people infected, and location
of event, etc. An architectural response that looks to the antibody system is conceptually
conceived to mimic the function of the immune system.

An analogy to antibodies is relevant to defining a (physical) response to bioterrorism;
similar to a bioterrorist attack, the presentation of pathogens within the antibody system
is unpredictable and requires an immediate form of response. The immune system
has components that are programmed to respond in a way that collectively provides a
response to a pathogen. An architectural and systemic response is made up of reactive
components dispersed throughout an urban infrastructure, each playing a role in providing
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a unified response during an event. An architectural metaphor can be established by
translating the role and behavior of individual components of the antibody system into
design strategies and architectural responses. Architecture modeled after the operative
immune system can be more reflective of reacting appropriately to the unpredictability
of various bioterrorist events. Analogous to the reaction of antibodies, a systemic
architecture is a model of emergency response capable of meeting unpredictable and
varied demands during a bioterrorist attack.
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Antibody System Response

Components of the antibody system are integral within the body’s overall defense
network. The collective ability of the entire immune system establishes the capability
of the entire system to perform as needed during a response. Each component has a
role in preventing and protecting the human body against being infected. As a whole,
the entirety of the system operates effectively because response capabilities are highly
dispersed throughout an established network, in this case the human body. Architectural
responses to an unpredictable event, such as bioterrorism should be mimetic of the
responsive nature of the components that establish the immune system—a reactive,
response network established with the ability to respond to unpredictable events within
the human body.

An architectural response activated, controlled and managed at a remote location (by
a communication network) would facilitate a response to bioterrorism with the ability
to be highly responsive to the flow of patients during an event—similar to the manner
in which the body is capable of responding to a disruption of the immune system. For
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example within the human body defense mechanisms are distributed and if a particular
area becomes infected there is a means of neutralizing the foreign object or substance
immediately regardless of the location of infection. A response distributed throughout
an urban context has the potential to provide the same flexibility of response during
an unpredictable event—if a portion of the city is attacked, there should be immediate
response options within the event context capable of handling infected patients.

A correlation between systemic and dispersed architectural and antibody components
within a large and variable response network sets forth the premise for a response
to bioterrorism to be addressed. Analogous to the coordinated and variable response
of the immune system, two types of response mechanisms—integrated and activated
collectively reference the biological metaphor that will be used to establish a systemic
context for an architectural response.

In the body, the exposure of a pathogen into the antibody system can involve two
inherently different types of response—inflammatory (immediate recognition) or
Figure 40, Pathogenic Response

40. Personal Image

immune (delayed recognition). (Figure 40) The manner in which these different response
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mechanisms are presented and recognized within the human body can be compared to
the release and recognition of chemical (immediate recognition) and biological agents
(delayed recognition) within an urban threat context. The antibody system activates
once it recognizes a pathogen, a foreign element that invades the immune system. This
is the metaphorical equivalent of a response to an event of bioterrorism within a threat
context once an agent has been released or recognized.

In the body, an inflammatory reaction occurs when a foreign object (such as the
contamination associated with a traumatic wound) enters a body—there is an obvious
disruption to the immune system. The antibody system immediately reacts because
the object entering the system contains (contaminated) pathogens that are easily
recognizable. Symptoms become apparent immediately and require medical attention
in addition to the natural antibody response in order to address the potential severity of
the event.

In an urban context, the release of a chemical agent and the reaction that it evokes
is similar to an inflammatory reaction within the antibody system. Identifying the
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agent employed in a chemical attack can occur immediately because its presence
is obvious—typically chemical agents have an odor or a color and can therefore be
recognized easily. An immediate medical response should be delivered to victims once
a chemical agent has been released. Decontamination, and other necessary medical
services administered during a response to a chemical attack is similar to the immediate
reaction of antibodies during an inflammatory reaction.

In the body, an immune reaction occurs when a pathogen presents itself within the
body, yet remains unrecognized for several days. An immune reaction progresses
slower than an inflammatory reaction because the pathogens enter into the system in a
more indiscrete manner than pathogens associated with an inflammatory reaction. For
example pathogens that present themselves when a cold or flu is developing, require
this type of response. Not only do symptoms progress gradually, they are often more
difficult to identify, however once the immune system recognizes them they begin the
immune reactive process.

In an urban bioterrorism response system, the release of a biological agent within a
context is similar to the presentation of a pathogen as when contracting a virus. Like
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pathogens of an immune response, biological agents present themselves slowly, and
indiscreetly. An agent is released within a context and often goes unnoticed for days
until symptoms start to present themselves within their victims. Medical services are
administered as well as antibiotics to prevent further infection once a biological agent
has been identified. Similarly, once an agent is identified, the response network is
activated. It is often difficult to identify the source of a biological agent, when and
Figure 41, Continuously Present Elements

where it was released. The lack of ability to identify this type of agent is similar to a
pathogen entering the body that requires an immune response—it is often difficult to

41. Personal Image
identify the source of infection.

Components of the antibody system (in the body), and an architectural and systemic
response to bioterrorism (within an urban context) are comprised of two basic typologies:
those that are continuously present and provide a latent functions and those that are
activated once a pathogen(or agent) is recognized.

In the body, continuously present elements of the immune system include lymph nodes,
lymphocytes and macrophages (Figure 41). Continually present components of the
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antibody system are significantly similar to healthcare facilities and alternate care
locations. In an urban context continuously present components of an architectural
response can be thought of as an Integrated Network—locations that are always present
within an urban context that inherently survey the condition of (public) health. During
a bioterrorist attack, these components help to form the basis for a systemic response—
acting as stationary, centralized elements. (Figure 42)
Figure 42, Integrated Network
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In the body, lymph nodes are stationary monitors dispersed internally throughout a
body, close to the skin’s surface (Figure 43). Lymph nodes monitor the status of the
immune system determining whether or not it has been infected by a pathogen; lymph
nodes act as a control center through which all the other components communicate
with. For the purpose of establishing an analogy between the immune system and
a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of lymph nodes that will translate to a
proposed response are the capability of monitoring the status or presence of a biological,
or chemical agent release, as well as the ability to serve as a control center for all
components to communicate with.

Figure 43, Lymph nodes and Lymphocytes

43. Personal Image
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Like lymph nodes in the body monitoring the status of a pathogen, the (existing and
proposed) public health network within a context should be constantly surveying for
pathogens (such as the flu, and viruses on a daily basis) that affect the population at large
and would continue to monitor public health trends during an act of bioterrorism. The
public health network, similar to lymph nodes (after a pathogen is recognized) would
communicate with other proposed response components (and the public) to make them
aware of the event. The proposed communication network that would link all types of
responders (including healthcare facilities) together during a response effort is similar to
the way that lymph nodes in the body act as a control center. Also comparable to lymph
nodes, in an urban environment the proposed communication network (along with the
existing public health network) would have the ability to monitor the current status
of health throughout a context. When necessary (i.e. during an act of bioterrorism)
the communication network would alert and activate the necessary responders, and
response settings within the threat context; similar to lymph nodes communicating with
the immune system when a foreign object (or pathogen) enters into the body’s system.

In the body, lymphocytes are mobile components that are constantly present and
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dispersed throughout the body. They communicate with lymph nodes (Figure 44)
and react based on the demands of pathogens present in the immune system. When
a pathogen is recognized by lymph nodes, the lymphocytes are alerted. In order to
contain the pathogen, lymphocytes have the responsibility to transport the pathogen
to a macrophage, a stationary component capable of pathogen containment. For the
purpose of establishing an analogy between the immune system and a response to
Figure 44, Lymphocytes Traverse
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bioterrorism the characteristics of lymphocytes that will be utilized are the ability to
be mobile throughout a context, the communication with lymph nodes and the reactive
nature once a pathogen is detected.

Within an urban context lymphocytes are similar to emergency responders who have the
capability to be mobilized such as Emergency Medical Responders, Law Enforcement,
and Fire Departments. Similar to lymphocytes they are distributed throughout a context
and accountable for providing a response to an event once it has been recognized. The
communication network is capable of communicating with the emergency responders
in order to activate a response in the same manner that lymph nodes communicate with
lymphocytes once a pathogen is recognized. Analogous to lymphocytes transporting a
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pathogen to the macrophages (in order to contain the pathogen) during response effort
EMS (ambulances, etc) act as transporters of infected patients to a stationary component
of the healthcare network. (Figure 45).

In the body macrophages are stationary components capable of containing a pathogen
(once it has been recognized). Similar to lymph nodes, macrophages are located near
Figure 45, Urban Response
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the surface of the body (Figure 46). For the purpose of establishing an analogy between
the immune system and a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of macrophages
that will be utilized are the ability to be stationary (established) components capable of
containing a pathogen (within a body).

In an urban context macrophages are similar to healthcare facilities,

stationary

components within an urban context that are capable of surveying the condition of
health based on the status of patients that present themselves (in particular to the
emergency department). Once a patient enters into a healthcare facility, treatment is
typically administered and similar to the function of a macrophage the disease or illness
Figure 46, Macrophages

46. Personal Image

is defeated or contained. During a bioterrorist attack, hospitals would be utilized
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to contain critical patients, ultimately with the purpose of eradicating a disease and
preventing further infection. (Figure 47)

In addition to components that are constantly present, the immune system contains
components that have the ability to be activated in response to a pathogen—antibodies
and antigens (Figure 48). In an urban response context activated components establish
the vocabulary for an Activated Network – locations that are dispersed throughout an
Figure 47, Healthcare Facilities
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affected or pathogenic area, but which serve latent everyday functions until the need for
immediate and rapid response arises once the recognition of a pathogen has occurred.

Antigens are mobile components that remain dormant until they are activated and released
by lymph nodes during a response. Antigens bind to the pathogen so that antibodies are
able to recognize the pathogen. For the purpose of establishing an analogy between the
immune system and a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of antigens that will
be utilized are the ability to be inactive until a response (and activation) is necessary as
determined by the lymph nodes (or the communication network.)
Figure 48, Antibodies and Antigens

48. Personal Image
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In an urban environment antigens are similar to specialized forms of emergency
response such as HAZMAT teams and NMRT. These responders are dormant on a
daily basis, however during an emergency situation such as a bioterrorist attack, they
are released by an existing (emergency) communication network and typically respond
at the epicenter—the point in which the agent (similar to a pathogen) was released or
recognized. (Figure 49)
Figure 49, Specialized Response
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In the human body antibodies are mobile components that are constantly being produced
by our bodies in response to everyday pathogens that we come in contact with, as well
as viruses that we have been exposed to. Antibodies are neutralizers that deactivate a
pathogen. For the purpose of establishing an analogy between the immune system and
a response to bioterrorism the characteristics of antibodies that will be utilized is their
constant presence and ability to deactivate a pathogen.

In an urban context antibodies (within the body) can be compared to the proposed
supplemental care locations that are established prior to a response. On a daily basis
these settings such a schools, hotels, clinics, and arenas constantly perform their normal
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functions; however during a response to bioterrorism they are settings that can be
converted to serve as secondary response locations primarily with the purpose to serve
less critical patients (such as the walking well) so that the primary healthcare network
doesn’t become unnecessarily inundated. Unlike antigens however, these response
resources are not mobile.

In the body, antibodies and antigens are capable of transporting a pathogen to the
Figure 50, Immune System Response
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macrophages, where ultimately the pathogen will be destroyed (Figure 50).

In an urban context the combined function of both antibodies and antigens is similar to
the proposed adaptation of the existing public transit network transporting patients to
proposed and established care locations. (Figure 51) The transportation network within
an urban context has the ability to assist in transporting patient to healthcare facilities
or alternative care location to receive treatment.

Similar to the responsiveness of antibody components when a pathogen (unpredictably)
Figure 51, Adapted Public Transportation

51. Personal Image
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presents itself within the immune system, an architectural response to bioterrorism should
also be systemic and flexible in order to efficiently respond to an act of bioterrorism.
The components of the immune system are integral elements within the body’s overall
defense network. The function of each components assists in establishing the biological
foundation that can help visualize and create a systematic response to bioterrorism
that employs existing and new architectural and other health and emergency response
resources.

This analogy to the human immune system defines a complete and systemic response
to bioterrorism. In the body when a pathogen presents itself, its size, and location
of recognition are unpredictable however an immediate response is required. These
conditions are similar to the release of biological and chemical agents within a threat
context—they type of agent used, as well as the size of the event and release location
are unpredictable, however an immediate response is required. The design of the
immune system allows it to respond in multiple ways that collectively provides a
response to a pathogen. An architectural and systemic response should also be made
up of reactive components dispersed throughout an urban infrastructure, each playing
a role in providing a unified response during an event. A systemic model including
both architectural and non-architectural resources analogous to our immune system is
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an ideal model of reacting appropriately to the unpredictability of various bioterrorist
events. Analogous to the reaction and performance of antibodies when a pathogen is
presented, a systemic approach should be better capable of meeting unpredictable and
varied demands of a bioterrorist attack.
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RESPONSE PROPOSAL
System Defined

A response to bioterrorism must be systemic in its organization, and take into
consideration potential resources and networks already in place within an urban context.
Components of a response network include both activated (Figure 52) and integrated
elements (Figure 53). Fundamental to providing a systemic response, “each (network)
can be thought of as a potential conduit for organizing or facilitating public responses”
(Glass, 3). Activated elements consist of smaller proposed architectural interventions
Figure 52, Activated Elements
52. Personal Image

(such as public health information terminals, and self-triage) located within the overall
transportation network--at transit stops within the overall transportation network or
elements within them. These proposed interventions would have a latent function
on a daily basis and are located externally to healthcare facilities. These small scale
elements include public transit nodes such as the metro rail and bus stations distributed
throughout the context within Washington, D.C. During an event the network control
center would be integrated to proposed elements (because of integrated technology) and
would therefore have the capability of activating these response interventions within
an urban environment; an opportunity to mitigate the walking well from healthcare
facilities would be provided. Activated elements dispersed throughout the extents of a

Figure 53, Integrated Elements
53. Personal Image

metropolitan context establish a network of many sites for the walking well to receive
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information that they may otherwise feel necessary to seek at a healthcare facility. This
will enable healthcare facilities to focus on providing healthcare to the most medically
critical victims of a bioterrorist attack.

Integrated elements are comprised of established building typologies that can serve
as temporary sites for the delivery of care to a large number of people. This would
include small scale healthcare facilities such as clinics, and ambulatory care facilities,
but could also include hotels, convention centers, and schools—places that are capable
of adapting spatial resources to meet the demands of lower acuity victims and the
walking well. For example during a natural disaster, The Red Cross assists in relief
efforts by providing food, temporary shelter, and health services. Similarly during a
bioterrorist attack public health information as well as some healthcare services will
need to be delivered in these temporary response sites specifically to prevent non-acute
victims from inundating health facilities designated for more acute care and isolation
or containment of those actually needing these resources.

A viable response network must take into account the infrastructure of an urban context
by utilizing elements that are easily identifiable and preferably have a widely recognized
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civic identity in the community. Recognizable landmarks and elements of civic
infrastructure used as sites for information, diagnosis and minor treatment can make
these resources more accessible to those in need. Using existing building structure
lessens reduces the amount of time and resources necessary to prepare a response with
essential resources such as water and electric. During an event, “responders will have
a limited window of opportunity to get things right” (Lasker, 2). The more defined a
response plan is, the more responsive and effective responders will be. The purpose
of a response network is to manage as best as possible response resources and patient
flow therefore directing potential patients to the most appropriate site for their specific
needs and condition. In addition to treating the acute and emergent victims of a given
biological or chemical event, a coordinated response must include activated resouces
where potential victims can receive public health information as well as minor triage
and treatment.

During an event, several types of response resources—both activated and integrated will
need to be extensively identified and distributed throughout a threat context, allowing
all potential victims the opportunity to be provided with healthcare according to their
needs.
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Integrated Response Network

The proposed integrated response network consists of established settings such as
healthcare facilities and alternative care locations that have the ability to treat and inform
large numbers of victims within the Washington, D.C. metro area (Figure 54, Figure
55). The proposed network provides a framework where various types of resources and
settings for care can be administered during an event. Based on the location, numbers,
Figure 55, Integrated Elements
55. Personal Image

and needs of the victims during an event, components of this integrated network can
be activated accordingly. The most obvious elements within the integrated response
network are healthcare facilities – including hospitals, clinics and other small facilities
that are equipped with the necessary spatial and material resources to treat critical
patients during this situation.

During an event, the proposed integrated response network is activated based on the
demands of patient flow. Healthcare facilities or alternative care locations area activated
accordingly so that a sufficient delivery of care is available as needed and dispersed
throughout a context. Available activated clinics and other treatment sites throughout
impacted areas during a bioterrorism attack would provide victims with less severe
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injuries the opportunity to seek care, allowing major healthcare facilities to focus on
critical victims. Dispersed diagnosis, triage and treatment sites throughout an urban
context would allow victims—both real and imagined--with multiple opportunities to
receive decentralized information and care as needed thus preventing any one facility
from becoming inundated and not able to provide adequate care.

An integrated network cannot mitigate victims and the walking well appropriately
without initial support provided by activated resources in the network. During an
event, latent self-diagnosis and information elements would be activated at a highly
distributed level throughout the city—in particular metro and bus transit stations—
so that the general public would have many opportunities to come in contact them.
Additional information would be available at these locations where appropriate care
could be sought based on the degree of exposure. These elements would also provide
wayfinding and information about alternative care locations and healthcare facilities
so that the system could direct victims to appropriate care locations throughout the
integrated network based on their self diagnosis.
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Figure 54, Integrated Response Locations within Washington D.C.
54. Personal Image
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Healthcare Facilities: The backbone of any integrated response network are existing
healthcare facilities—including hospitals, clinics and other small facilities that are
already equipped and established spatially and materially to provide a comprehensive
medical response (Figure 56, 57). Based on simulation modeling of patient flow
during an event, those patients in critical need of care would be directed to established
healthcare facilities. In order to fully determine whether or not Washington D.C. is
Figure 56, Healthcare Facility Network
56. Personal Image

capable of handling the potential influx of victims from various scenarios an analysis
of existing bed capacity and average availability must be understood.

Based on an informal assessment of existing healthcare facilities within Washington,
D.C. it was assumed that no additional hospital-based facilities will be needed to
supplement existing bed capacity.

Existing healthcare facilities are adequately

equipped, programmed and sized to handle the demands of critical victims as currently
distributed throughout the entire urban context during an attack of bioterrorism. This
assessment is based on the proposition that non-critical patients will be served outside
of hospitals at established alternative care locations, and that the walking well will be
mitigated through the activation of information interjections at transit nodes.

Average
Daily ED Visits

Average Occupancy

Beds

105

(1) Walter Reed Army
Medical Center

235

192
[43]

55

(2) Psychiatric Institute of
Washington

104

67
[37]

N/A

(3) Providence Hospital

330

247
[83]

94

(4) Sibley Hospital

226

63

(5) Washington Hospital
Center
(5) National Rehabilitation
Hospital
(5) Children’s National
Medical
(6) Howard University
Medical Center
(7) Georgetown University
Hospital
(8) George Washington
University Hospital
(9) Medlink Hospital

834

162
[64]
625
[209]
106
[22]
150
[38]
234
[59]
178
[105]
155
[76]
N/A

(10) D.C. General Hospital

150

141

(11) St. Elizabeth’s Hospital

609

(12) Greater Southeast
Hospital

278

97
[53]
584
[25]
183
[95}

69

367,000

TOTAL

128
188
293
283
231
23

4,228

161
N/A
113
119
59
119
N/A

N/A
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Facilities located in Washington, D.C. are capable of handling the predicted
critical patient load during a bioterrorist attack.
Figure 57, Existing Resource Capability Healthcare Network
57. Personal Image
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Alternative Care Locations: The secondary response sites of the proposed integrated
network include locations such as schools, arenas, convention centers, and hotels. These
sites must already be pre-equipped with spatial and strategic resources (such as water
and electricity) and have the ability to be converted to handle the needs of potentially
large numbers of non-critical patients (Figure 54). During an attack, presumably fear
and panic will result in part because people are unfamiliar with this type of event; people
will flood major transportation arteries in an effort to evacuate the city, as well as known
healthcare settings in an effort to receive treatment that they might not need. Providing
and directing people to additional activated response sites within urban infrastructures
disperses opportunities for non-critical and the walking well to be diagnosed outside of
centralized (conventional) healthcare facilities. These sites can help alleviate the load
placed on healthcare facilities. An abundant number of potential treatment locations
capable of responding can help re-assure the public that they will be able to receive
care. Panic can be better addressed through a systemic and widely dispersed response
at alternative care locations. The alleviation of fear can be made possible through the
implementation of “a broad array of places—work sites, shops, malls, schools, day care
centers, hospitals, clinics, cultural institutions, recreational and entertainment facilities,
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government buildings, apartment buildings, and transportation terminals—serving as
safe havens” (Lasker, 5).

Alternative Care Typologies: All alternative care typologies must have adequate
plumbing, electricity (assuming no power outages have occurred) and shelter for the
potentially large number of potential victims predicted based on simulation modeling
prior to an event.
Figure 58, Washington D.C. Hotels
58, Personal image

Hotels: Given that they are already equipped with bedrooms and beds, hotels have the
opportunity to provide intermediate care when hospitals are at capacity (Figure 58). A
hotel would not serve as an immediate lower intensity inpatient point of care to noncritical patients; however patients who are in need of observation but not in critical
condition could be transported to a converted hotel rather than hospital.

Educational Facilities: Schools are typically designated and equipped to provide
shelter for large numbers of potential victims during a wise variety of disaster response
Figure 59, Washington D.C. Schools
59. Personal Image

scenarios (Figure 59). For example, a cafeteria, gymnasium or auditorium has the
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ability to provide a place of refuge for potential victims. Classrooms can provide
smaller treatment areas allowing patients to be dispersed based on their level of need.
The existing structure and organization of a school alleviates the need for responders to
erect and establish temporary settings that otherwise would need to be provided.

Recreational and Entertainment Facilities: These settings such as indoor stadiums,
arenas, etc are advantageous because they are designed to handle the flow of large
numbers of people (Figure 60). Multiple points of entry provide the ability for many
potential patients to be provided with shelter and care more immediately. Assuming
that screening and triage capabilities were stationed at each point of entry, arriving
victims could be directed to either further care or refuge. The biggest advantage to this
type of building typology is the ability to house such an immense number of potential
Figure 60, Washington D.C. Recreational and
Entertainment
60. Personal Image

victims.

The predicted number of non-critical patients will be greater than critical patients that
result during a bioterrorist attack. Similar to the response of the Red Cross during a
natural disaster or other mass casualty situation, these alternative locations would be
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served and equipped by disaster relief medical staff and other public health officials
and volunteers. During natural disasters, the Red Cross is capable of responding
with necessary medical supplies and staffing. Typically, this type of response takes
place within existing infrastructure such as schools, stadiums or arenas. The proposed
integrated network would be capable of activating in a similar manner—utilizing local
staff and medical stockpiles.

Prior to an event, appropriate alternative care locations would be identified by a local
jurisdiction; during an event, based on the location of an event epicenter and probable/
actual victim flow, a variety of screening and treatment sites would be activated to serve
non-critical patients and the walking well. Identifying these resources includes assessing
spatial capabilities, as well as an estimating capacity level. Alternative care locations
also must be sought out based on other basic programmatic functions—providing
kitchens, bathrooms, and large waiting areas. In order to understand a generalized load
capacity, building footprints were analyzed in the District of Columbia. The larger the
footprint, generally the greater potential to handle a considerable patient load. Prior
to an event square footage and capacity of probable alternative care locations would be
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assessed by planning officials (and documented) to a greater degree. It is understood
that “large spaces, such as cafeterias, or auditoriums can be used for observation of
large numbers of patients with minor or not apparent injuries” (Macintyre, 146). The
care delivered at alternative care locations would be less (medically) demanding and
would be limited to non-invasive procedures such as the administering of immunization
during an instance of bioterrorism. These alternative care locations would require no
additional architectural modifications but would however require a supplement of
medical resources and supplies. Most emergency response units are equipped with
a stockpile of these resources to be utilized during similar situations in which care
must be administered outside of a healthcare facility. During an event, not only would
emergency responders staff a location, but medical supplies would be delivered to each
alternative care location based on the type of care predicted to be needed.
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Activated Network

During an event, a wide variety of potential response sites will be activated based on
the relationship to the epicenter as well as the proximity to the greatest demand of
victims. The number of responding locations would depend on the size, nature and
impact of the actual attack. During a chemical attack it is predicted that a greater
number of walking well will be generated within a closer proximity to the epicenter,
therefore more alternative care locations will need to be activated to meet the demands
of these potential victims; fewer locations would need to be activated further from the
epicenter. Given the likelihood of an immediate recognition of the agent released, a
response location would typically be established by hazmat teams at the immediate
epicenter.

The release of a biological agent would demand a response that is dispersed throughout
a context (at alternative care settings) due to the delay of recognition; a higher number
of walking well are likely to present themselves across a much larger geographical area
during this type of response because of the flu-like symptoms typical of biological agents.
During either a chemical or biological event, dispersed architectural interventions that
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convey event related public health information would be necessary to alleviate fear and
panic throughout the potential victim population. Despite the type of agent released
it can be assumed that the larger the epicenter, the more victims and walking well are
predicted to be generated.

Staffing during an event would be based on available local medical staff not only including
those within healthcare facilities, but (health department) public health employees. The
activation of this temporary healthcare setting would require transportation of supplies
to the alternative care locations—this can be performed by local emergency responders
such as fire and other emergency responders. It can be assumed that ambulances will
be consumed with transporting critical victims from the epicenter to the healthcare
facilities, however other emergency response vehicles could be utilized to transport
medical supplies from local stockpiles to alternative care locations. The network
should only be activated to the degree needed to meet the demand and scope of patient
typology and flow.

Services provided would include immunization and acute care services. For example
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during a chemical attack or an event where trauma might occur during an explosion—
victims needing only the dressing of minor wounds and abrasions would be treated at
alternative care locations rather than at hospitals. Critical patients who may be in need
of more invasive attention would be transferred to healthcare facilities where more acute
services could be offered. Psychological services as well as public health information
would be included at alternative care locations such as educational facilities, hotels,
and recreational venues in order to better serve the walking well who would be directed
to alternative care locations.

Post-event it is significant to restore activated alternative care locations to their prior
use as promptly as possible once all care is rendered. Doing so provides the public with
reassurance that life has returned to normal conditions. Educational facilities, hotels,
and recreational venues should not be activated unnecessarily; they should only be
activated when the demand of non-critical patients has the potential to quickly inundate
the healthcare system. Post-event clean-up and sanitation must occur before a location
can return to its normal function as quickly as possible. After containment and on-site
treatment of victims has been completed following a chemical event, it is important
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that the surrounding context of the epicenter be decontaminated so that any residual
remainders of a chemical agent are removed from the exposed environment. This
clean-up and restoration must take place to minimize environmental risk to people that
live, work or need to move through the immediate area and in part to reassure the public
that the subsequent return to normal use of these settings does not pose a health threat.
It alleviates an element of fear and stigma associated with and event.

Potential victims, including the walking well would be made aware of all activated
locations for care during an event through the placement of digital information displays
at critical transit nodes and pathways including but not limited to Metro stations and
highway message boards. These displays would convey public health information as
well as media coverage of the movement of people within the city. Given access to
accurate information on the event and where to seek appropriate help, potential victims
would be more likely to seek care at the most appropriate accessible locations rather
than inundating hospitals. Didactic interjections would also be visible at activated
care sites prior to an event, similar to public service notices indicating the location of
a bomb shelter. Therefore an appropriate awareness of a possible response sites can be
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made more apparent. If the general public is visually made aware of response elements
and sites on a regular basis (prior to an event), then during an event they will have a
general understanding of where to seek care.

During an event an urban-wide response is proposed through the activation of
architectural interventions such as public health information terminals, thermal scans
and self-triage kiosks and wayfinding features located within the public mass transit
networks such as the metro system stations and bus stops. (Figure 61) These sites are
located throughout the context Washington DC. The purpose of these activated sites
and elements in the response network is to direct victims to appropriate care at many
Figure 61, Washington D.C. Activated
Transportation Network

locations throughout the urban context before they seek care at, and inundate, acute
healthcare facilities. Public health information displays and terminals would provide a

61. Personal Image

cohesive information across the entire response network; information conveyed to the
public would remain consistent and controlled by a single, response network control
center . Activated elements such as thermal scans or self-triage kiosks within metro
stations would function independently of each other; they are based on the immediate
individual interaction of the general public including potential victims. The activation
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of wayfinding elements at the street level would be dependent upon the activation of
response sites surrounding the metro system. Wayfinding would only be activated
if alternative care locations were functioning as care settings—the activation of care
settings would be dependent upon patient flow generated by the response to self-triage.
All proposed response elements would be connected to the network control center so
that an overall picture of the evolving event impact can be understood and responded
to appropriately.

A series of public health information terminals within the transit network would be
designed and located to help disseminate public health information, and enable real and
perceived victims to perform self-diagnosis through a series of health related questions.
Self diagnosis could be accomplished through either small-scale architectural kiosks or
by calling into a dedicated telephone system and answering a series of teleprompted
questions. The series of questions would be designed to assess the patients current
condition and determine the degree of care in which potential victims most likely need
to receive. In addition to providing self-triage, this response can direct victims to
appropriate location for care—a healthcare facility or an alternative care site. These
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programmatic functions providing information, self triage and wayfinding can work
effectively to serve a large number of potential victims due to the way in which
transit networks are dispersed within an urban context, as well as their iconographic
representation. Metro stations are generally known landmarks and nodes for residents,
commuters and most of the people who live, work and move through an urban context.
Through this didatic presence there is a greater potential for the walking well to have
early access to front line information, diagnosis and referral. These elements may be
used by any potential ambulatory victim, but will ultimately be able to meet the most
immediate and appropriate needs of the walking well. Most victims however, won’t
know whether they are contaminated and need treatment or not until they engage the
proposed diagnostic station elements.

Each component of the overall response network has its own responsibility and role,
yet interconnects with the other as a part of the systemic response to bioterrorism.
Activated elements, including both widely distributed diagnosis-information-referral
sites and secondary treatment sites, together with established healthcare and emergency
response elements are combined to form an integrated network. Activated resources are
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designed to be the first point of contact with potential victims due to the high number
of dispersed locations.
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Figure 62, Washington D.C. Metro System Transportation Network
62. Personal Image
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Transportation Network: Mass transit systems are not only utilized daily by many
potential victims but are also capable of transporting victims, both critical and non
critical, to locations to receive care. It is plausible to assume that the use of “untraditional
forms of transport may be needed because EMS assets will be challenged to meet the
needs of the disaster” (Hick, 8). Urban transit systems, including metro rail systems,
bus routes and the network of streets, will be used as principal components of the
activated network. Bus or metro trains can be used to alleviate the predicted transport
Figure 63, Metro System
63. wmata.gov

demand that will be placed on existing emergency resources, such as ambulances
and other emergency vehicles. During an emergency response public transportation
systems could be dedicated as patient transporters, no architectural intervention or
physical change would be necessary. Rail mass transit systems are viable response
models because they are scalable to the demands of patient flow —more trains can
be added, or the direction of a line can change based on the location of event and care
sites. Similarly, bus systems offer the same capability of being altered to meet the
demands of patient flow however, they are much more flexible and less vulnerable to
disruption than the rail systems. The nodes at which metro lines, bus routes, and street
systems intersect establishes a series of potential transfer, control and potential triage
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sites where potential victims can be sorted and transported as needed either by nontraditional or traditional modes of emergency response throughout an urban context.
(Figure 62)

In Washington DC, the Metro not only serves the district proper but also extends into
Maryland, and Virginia—therefore expanding the limits and scope of the potential
response network (Figure 63). On average, the Metro carries 190 million people per
year and provides the ability to commute to 41% of people working within the city
(wmata.com). The fact that so many commuters rely on the metro on a daily basis
establishes that the metro will be capable of acting as a ‘net’ during an event. If an
event were to take place during a weekday, it can be assumed that while evacuating the
city, a large percentage of commuters will come in contact with the metro—either the
train or a bus. Therefore the transit system has the great potential to provide sites for
disseminating information, serving as self diagnosis sites and redirecting the public as
needed in responding to an event.
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Components
Arenas
Museums
Metro Stations

Figure 64, Washington D.C. Civic Nodes and Landmarks
64. Personal Image
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Understanding that the mass transit systems are potential targets means that commuters
within a targeted metro station would immediately be evacuated and treated at the
street level in the event of an attack on a station or line. The metro would obviously
no longer be able to serve as a means of transport during this type of event. In that
situation the city bus network would be activated to transport non-critical and critical
patients to healthcare facilities and alternative care locations. The bus system would
also need to be re-configured to run routes that serve metro stops. Given the number
of people who do not utilize mass transit – emergency vehicles must also become a
part of the Activated Network. Commuters within their personal vehicles would be
informed through digital street and highway signage and directed towards emergency
response sites and resources along their route. Vehicular commuters could also phone
into a dedicated system that allows them to self diagnose through an automated system.
Utilizing all transportation networks within an urban context greatly increases the
number of potential victims receiving public health information, or self-diagnosis
through the distribution of activated elements during an event.
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Nodes and Landmarks: In order to strengthen didactic awareness during an event,
activated elements must take into consideration that a wide variety of civic nodes and
landmarks possess a vital iconographic representation throughout an urban context.
(Figure 64)

Transit nodes are established through the intersection of metro stations, bus routes, and
the street grid, providing the greatest potential for reaching and transporting all types
of potential victims, including both critical victims and the walking well (Figure 59).
The mode of transportation utilized by each category of victim would be established
particular to each event, the patient load, and the activated alternative care networks.
Through planning and utilizing all modes of public transportation during an event, a
flexible approach to response is established by providing various response options.
For example, if the metro rail were to be targeted during an event, other options for
transferring patients are in place. Response sites are identified by existing signage
demarcating the entrance to a metro station, as well as a bus stop signage.
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Within densely populated and heavily visited tourist areas some nodes and landmarks
of iconographic representation may be unfamiliar to the visitor. Activated elements
must be easily identified ‘points of attraction’ that a ‘tourist’ would recognize. These
locations are significant not only because of their didactic presence, but because of
the density of population that they typically encompass. Similar types of response,
including self-diagnosis and public health information would be conveyed at highly
legible landmarks throughout an urban context.
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Design Criteria

The activated intervention selected for architectural study and development includes
kiosks for public health information, self-diagnosis, and wayfinding. For a response to
be implemented comprehensively based on the fact that bioterrorism is a low probability,
hard to predict event design interventions dispersed throughout the city must have a
latent everyday purpose in addition to an activated response after a bioterrorist attack.
The basis for each designed interventions includes the following attributes: integrated
technology, didactic representation, and the ability to provide a dynamic response.
Each type of architectural interjection must be relatively low cost, widely dispersed,
and have multiple latent and activated functions because the nature of bioterrorism
means that an architectural or systemic response may be rarely or never actually needed
in any given location.

Bioterrorism response sites must not only be minimum cost but also require nominal
to no maintenance—preferably having a long shelf-life so that more locations can be
widely dispersed and replicated through a threat context. A long shelf life reinforces
the ability of a response to occur effectively regardless of the time that it remained un-
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activated.

Integrated Technology: Integrated technology is the ability to provide a continuous
and dynamic response to patient flow during a bioterrorist event with minimal human
resources.

Patient flow during an event will be fluid and unpredictable, design

interventions have to be immediately reactive to this demand so that healthcare
facilities do not become inundated with walking well. A response to bioterrorism
should therefore have the ability to activate instantaneously and not be hindered by
the inability of emergency responders (already at high demand) to deploy design
interventions throughout an urban context.

Integrated technology is a covert component of the design criteria for a response to
bioterrorism that occurs within the activated network and serves as a link between the
programmatic responses—public health information, self diagnosis, and wayfinding.
Integrated technology focuses on providing constant communication and information
to the public during an event; emergency responders are alleviated of the task of
directing or delivering information and services to potential victims at many sites
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during a response.

The activation of information-diagnosis-treatment sites linked through integrated
technology during an event of bioterrorism is similar to airbags deploying within a
vehicle (Figure 65). Multiple sensors, the controller and the airbags themselves form an
integrated system that detects sudden changes in the state of a vehicle, including rapid
deceleration and extreme physical changes. When conditional changes are detected the
Figure 65, Deploying Airbags
65. google.com

airbag is deployed automatically in order to provide a form of protection to the vehicles
occupants. In a bioterrorism response system all interventions should be linked through
integrated technology to an emergency control center. Once an event occurs and is
identified by emergency responders the public must be provided with public health
information, and sources of self-diagnosis and wayfinding. The emergency control
center, located outside of the immediate urban context to reduce the risk of becoming
a target of attack, would have the immediate ability to activate and/or deploy the
necessary response interventions throughout an urban context. As the dynamics of an
event change the control center would adjust the information conveyed to the public, as
well as the number and location of activated design interventions.
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Dynamic Responsiveness: Dynamic responsiveness is the ability for a designed
intervention to react to the unpredictability of a bioterrorist event—specifically
potential patient flow. Bioterrorism is unpredictable in nature; design interventions
such as public health information, self-diagnosis and way finding, as well as alternative
care locations need to be capable of activating in many ways. (Figure 66)

Dynamic responsiveness accommodates the need for various response models to occur
Figure 66, Dynamic Responsiveness
66. google.com

based on the typology of an event; commercial aircraft are similar in that their emergency
response features accounts for various types reactions to potential events. Planes are
equipped with oxygen masks activated through a type of integrated technology that is
controlled by a hierarchical network once conditional changes are detected. Likewise
interventions dispersed throughout an urban context must be capable of activation
without direct human response at the immediate deployment or activation location.
Proposed design interventions would be connected to a command and control center
through integrated technological devices and software. For example, human resources
at a remote communication center would be able to activate responses through the use
of software connected to individual elements within the transit network.
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During an event a command and control center, comprised of various typologies of
emergency responders, and medical professionals, would determine what dispersed
elements would need to be activated based on the monitoring and dispersion of the agent
and patient flow. For example during a chemical event it is immediately and physically
evident where the agent has been dispersed and what the potential patient flow may
entail—based on this information the control center would be able to determine where
response components need to be activated.

During a biological event because of the delay in recognition the network control center
would need to monitor patient demand and activate a response based on patient flow
until more details are determined about the exact location of release. The network
control center would be located remotely from the threat context, and would be both
human, and computer-based. This center would be the main location for all typologies
of responders to collect and disperse information pertinent to an event. In other words
a widespread response may be necessary until details are established regarding the size
and scope of a biological release. Once it has been determined where a biological agent
was released then potentially exposed victims can be informed by the command and
control center.
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Another response analogy to be found in commercial aircraft are the flotation devices
located under each passengers seat and emergency door (evacuation) slides. In the
event of a survivable emergency event passengers would deploy their own device—
direct human interaction is immediately needed for a response to be deployed. This
type of response is analogous to the network of alternative care sites. Alternative care
locations, such as hotels, schools, and arenas cannot serve as care locations without
being activated and the direct response and assistance offered by emergency responders.
Potential victim flow during a response to an event will be unpredictable in terms of
the type of care and degree of assistance that will need to be provided. Dynamic
responsiveness is provided by the reactive nature of both designed interventions and
the alternative care network during an act of bioterrorism.

Didactic Awareness: Didactic awareness is the ability for a designed intervention to
convey a cognitive awareness of response locations prior to an event. In an effort to
alleviate panic, response efforts will be established at activated alternative care locations
and nodes throughout an urban context external to healthcare facilities. During an
event, an activated diagnosis, treatment and information sites located at recognizable
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locations must be something that the public can locate and recognize.

The low probability, high consequence nature of bioterrorism implies that fear and
panic will presumably result during an event. During the Cold War, fallout shelter
signs (Figure 67) were employed to designate the location of shelters that had been
identified, surveyed and pre-supplied to supposedly safe havens in the event of a
nuclear attack. During any type of terrorist attack panic will be evident, however past
Figure 67, Fallout Shelter Sign
67. google.com

episodic events indicate an overall sense of cooperation from the public. It is believed
that “social chaos does not occur in disaster situations because people tend to respond
in accordance with their customary norms and roles” (Glass, 3). During the cold war,
shelter signs created a didactic awareness among the general public, and ultimately
established an association with a place of safety. The uncertainty of what to and where
to go can be alleviated if the presence of a response is established on a daily basis (prior
to an event) in order to provide the public with further information regarding response
strategies.

Another example of didactic awareness can be seen in fire alarm pull stations present
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throughout public buildings. (Figure 68) There is a cognitive awareness of their
presence and the response that they will provide during an emergency situation.
During a response to an attack of bioterrorism, design interventions providing public
health information, self-diagnosis, and wayfinding need to be deployed throughout an
urban context. Similar to fire alarms, it is necessary for the public to understand their
response and location during an event. Didactic awareness should be built into any
fixed response location including components of the activated and integrated network.
Figure 68, Fire Alarm
68. google.com
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DEFINING A RESPONSIVE PROGRAM
Program Components
The programmatic focus of this thesis proposal is on infrastructure elements dispersed
throughout a threat context and designed to intercept, diagnose and redirect the walking
well away from emergency departments and acute care hospitals. This thesis assumes
that existing acute and critical care healthcare facilities can adequately handle the care
of critical victims—therefore proposed program components do not need to include
functions for critical victims that will presumably exist. It also assumes that non-critical
victims will be treated at nearby schools, hotels, and other alternative care locations
with sufficient spatial allocations as needed for an event. In some instances mobile
resources such as EMS and HAZMAT teams will be deployed to some of these sites
to compliment latent facilities and resources already in play. It can be understood that
external supplies will be provided by pre-positioned and dispersed stockpiles, such as
those established by the National Metropolitan Response Team (NMRT), or the Centers
for Disease Control. When establishing the response program components, healthcare
facilities and alternative care locations need no further architectural attention beyond
existing spatial and resource allocations.

Each designed element proposed within the response program has two types of
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functions—latent and activated. Public health information would be made available
during both normal day-to-day use and during/after a bioterrorism event, however the
information conveyed would be pertinent to the status of the event and direct people
how to react. Metro ticketing terminals will latently serve in their normal capacity for
riders, when activated they will have the potential to be converted into self diagnosis
stations, providing potential victims with the opportunity to triage themselves.
Conditional wayfinding elements and signage located at the street level would have the
ability to be digitally converted during an attack and have the capability to direct noncritical victims to a dispersed alternative care locations. All three program responses
are interconnected to a network control center and event management centers through
integrated information technology.

Network control center: A network control center establishes a non-architectural
connection between designed interventions and emergency responders. The existing
and proposed network control center must provide information and continuity between
dispersed program/system elements during the entire timeline of a bioterrorist event.
Components must be interconnected through the use of technology to the network
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control center so that an appropriate response is based on specific event typology and
patient flow. Technology integrated within each program response enables responders
the ability to monitor event impacts and patterns of infection/contamination and relay
immediate, up to date information to all elements in the system during an event.

Most healthcare facilities currently have a designated emergency response center.
Typically these response centers have an established connection to external emergency
responders, such as EMS responders as well as fire and other types of local response
units. The intent of a control center within a healthcare facility however is to provide
consistent, ongoing response and monitoring of onsite resources during an emergency
situation. Therefore each healthcare facility currently functions as an isolated entity
throughout an urban context and does not comprehensively take into consideration
response efforts being made at other potentially impacted facilities. Multiple hospitals
functioning as an individual emergency responder creates the potential for redundancy
of resources, lack of coordination and a less effective response during an urban wide
event.
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This thesis assumes a proposed communication and coordination network that would
include a centralized response center (determined prior to an event) outside of the threat
context that would coordinate all emergency responders, public officials, representatives
from healthcare facilities and medical staff collectively so that they have the ability
to act as a single entity. The intent of a central response location is to provide and
monitor a distributed response based on resources and patient flow throughout an entire
urban context. The specific location of a centralized response center would be based
on the size of an urban context and available resources located outside of a particular
threat context. A centralized response center does not necessarily need to be designated
within a healthcare facility, but rather could be located in an alternative care location.
Within the context of Washington DC, federal representation and authority would take
precedent due to the potential threat targets such as the White House, Capital, and other
major Federal Institutions. Despite the role of the federal jurisdiction, local responders
would play a key role in providing care during a bioterrorist attack. All responders
within the coordinated network would monitor the situation, provide status reports and
receive coordinated directives thus determining the type of response needed and where
it needs to take place.

138

A control center would be staffed by representatives of each organization and
jurisdiction in the response network therefore establishing a sense of continuity during
a response. In addition to conventional medical staff and emergency responders, other
representation would include public health official and media responders who would
be present within the control center. “Hospitals would need to communicate with and
receive support from a wide variety of organizations, including other hospitals and
local, state and federal health officials, as well as emergency management and public
safety agencies” (Inglesby, 443). The proposed control center and network control
center would be activated immediately, so that critical decisions would be made as to
what programmatic elements would be activated as necessary, and information would
be conveyed to the public to respond accordingly and alleviate panic.

Panic and confusion can be minimized by providing consistent and accurate information
to the public during a disaster. During an event “the release of inaccurate, confusing
or contradictory information by leaders and/or the media has the potential to increase
levels of fear, panic and demoralization as well as to discredit authorities” (Glass,
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4). Typically during any type of episodic event media representation can not always
be considered as a complete and accurate representation of the actual situation. The
media has the opportunity to play a major role in notifying the public appropriately
during a bioterrorist event if media sources are directly a part of the central response
center. They would be informed immediately by authorities within the response center
and would serve as one information conduit for the control center, directly informing
the public. It is essential that the central response center establish “a close working
relationship between (the media), decision makers and those involved in response
operations” (Glass, 5). Due to the mobile nature of occupants within an urban threat
context, widespread access to health related information beyond the capability of
existing system notification elements within the transportation network is necessary in
order to provide the most opportunities for potential victims to gain information about
a bioterrorist attack outside of the immediate urban threat context.

Public Health Information Display Elements: Multiple types of information should be
conveyed to the general public throughout the (urban) threat context—“healthcare staff
should provide information on the agent involved, potential short- and long- term effects,
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recommended treatment, stress reactions, and possible avenues to further assistance”
(Macintyre, 246). Public health display elements would provide information both
preceding, during and post- event. (Figure 69)

Public advisory display elements would be located throughout an urban context—
specifically within the transit network, streets, highways and other movement pathways.
Figure 69, Display Element

Display elements would be integrated within buses and bus shelters (street level) as
well as on trains and metro stations (below grade). These display elements would

69. google.com

be operated on both an activated and latent basis and would therefore not only be
used during an event. Currently within the metro system there are display panels at
the train platform informing the public of arrivals and system information. (Figure
70) These elements are controlled through the use of technology at a single location.
Similarly, public health displays would be technologically integrated to the network
control center. The health content displayed on a latent basis would be decided upon
by a public health representative. Display panels could also be individualized allowing
information to be tailored to the needs of a particular area. For example panels near the

Figure 70, Metro Display Panel

70. Personal Image

event epicenter would need more specific information during a response compared to
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information displayed further away from the epicenter that may only give an alert that
an event has occurred.

Non-event public health information would provide information useful to the target
population, or cover current health trends. During flu season for example, public health
information could provide users with information as to where to receive a flu shot.
Similarly, within the District of Columbia the potential opportunity for a bioterrorist
attack is measured by a threat level indicator (dictated by the Department of Homeland
Security). Once the threat level reaches a high threat indication the display element
would convey security measures that the public need to take, or be aware of.

Activated public health display elements during an event would provide potential
and actual victims with the opportunity to receive information pertinent to the type
of incident that has occurred (i.e. what symptoms occur when a patient has been
exposed to anthrax, or how is an agent spread from person to person). Emergency
response representatives within the network control center would collectively decide
what information should be conveyed to the public. More significant is the fact that
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information could change instantaneously based on the status and impact of an event.

A network comprised of “systems and protocols for communicating timely and accurate
information to the public are critical during crisis or emergency situations” (NIMS,
28). Providing information to the public establishes a sense of control at the victim
level during what may seem like an uncontrollable event. Similarly, health information
conveyed at a dispersed level would provide the walking well with the information they
would otherwise seek from healthcare officials and facilities.

Independent-Triage: The general public should have the ability to independently
perform an initial form of self triage during an event response. Potential victims will
want to seek immediate answers as to whether or not they are infected. The impact of the
walking well can be tempered through a series of opportunities for independent triage
(including thermal scans and self-diagnosis kiosks) dispersed throughout a network
of mass transit stations and nodes. Establishing independent triage sites throughout
a context will assist in coping with the potentially widespread impact of a bioterrorist
event.
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Washington D.C. is in the process of implementing an automated independent triage
system through an electronic assessment either via phone or internet. This system
is comprised of a series of ‘yes/no’ questions specific to the symptoms that a victim
may be experiencing due to the exposure to any type of bioterrorist agent. When
performing a individual assessment “after the computer leads someone through the
questions, either online or over the telephone, the patient would be advised according
to what the symptoms seem to be. The options the system might offer include: stay
at home in voluntary quarantine, go to a designated site for follow-up care, move to
an isolation facility or just relax” (Goldstein, 1). During a time in which medical staff
will be at high demand, this type of system provides a greater sense of security to the
walking well because they are able to receive an answer much more immediately than
otherwise possible. An electronic self triage system is a viable means of providing
triage extraneous to a healthcare facility without direct assistance from medical staff.
This system is a comprehensible and practical means of response, however it only
targets individuals with access to a phone, or the internet—those who don’t have that
access to these amenities need to also be served.
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Potential victims who do not have access to either a phone or the internet can be served
through the dispersion of independent triage stations throughout a threat context. The
number of triage stations needed to provide an opportunity for individual triage can
be based on the average number of people typically present on a daily basis within
a given context that may not have access to a phone, or the internet. There are two
Figure 71, Thermochromic Material
71. google.com

types of independent triage that are technologically available and can be implemented
extraneous to the telephone/internet method of diagnosis – thermal scans (Figure 71),
and self-diagnosis kiosks. Thermal scans provide a quick generalized diagnosis that
ultimately serves as a filter, sorting the actual victims from the walking well. Although
a slower response, self-diagnosis stations would supplement thermal scans and would
provide a more detailed level of assessment. These kiosks could be located at a wide
variety of locations throughout an urban threat context including transit nodes, gas
stations, rest stops, etc.

The process of individual triage through the use of thermal scans involves checking a
basic vital sign—in this case body temperature. Thermals scans operate in a manner that
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once a user comes in contact (by touch of the hand) with the thermochromic material,
the surface (after a few seconds) will change color based on the temperature of the
user’s body. A common side effect for patients who have come in contact with predicted
types of biological or chemical agents, is elevated body temperature. Thermocromic
surfaces can be regulated to be reactive only to temperatures that would classify as a
fever. A user will visually receive either a positive or a negative reaction. (Figure 72)
Coding could be printed onto the thermochromic surface explaining the translation of
Figure 72, Thermochromic Display Element
72. google.com

color and temperature range. The surface would also display additional instructions
similar to the telephone/internet responses. If in fact they have a fever, they would be
directed to a nearby self-diagnosis station typically located within a close proximity to
a thermal scanner.

It is proposed that within proximity to thermal scans, (latent) ticket vending terminals
within a metro station would be activated during an event, and converted into selfdiagnosis stations. (Figure 73) Prior to an event, software would be implemented
into the terminals to provide the necessary response during an event. When using a
Figure 73, Ticketing Vending Terminals
73. Personal Image

self-diagnosis terminal, the user would also be thoroughly questioned about the state
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of their health, similar to typical questions asked by a triage nurse at a healthcare
facility. Ultimately a form of electronic assessment “would ease pressure on hospitals”
(Goldstein, 2). The self diagnosis process would also act as a means of collecting
public health information—particularly patient information and tracking, allowing
responding authorities to survey the pattern of disease and victim flow.

Wayfinding Elements: Wayfinding elements (Figure 74) must be provided to help
Figure 74, Wayfinding Elements
74. Personal Image

people navigate to healthcare settings such as hospitals and activated alternative care
locations once they have received the results of an individual triage assessment. These
elements will be integrated or attached to existing infrastructure elements in the urban
fabric such as light poles, traffic signals, electronic highway advisory signs, billboards,
transit signs, etc. The wayfinding system targets all users, but in particular those who
may be unfamiliar with appropriate care locations. Potential victims unfamiliar with
their environment may be less likely to successfully find alternative care locations
compared to local residents. In addition, wayfinding as a response program component
can help alleviate fear and panic by reassuring potential victims of their ability to locate
appropriate care settings.
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Wayfinding must occur at two separate levels—underground (within the metro transit
system) and at street level. Similar to the way in which public health information is
distributed, a connection to a coordinated response network would be established and
would control the information conveyed to the public based on the scale and location
of an throughout an urban context. The adaptation of existing information devices on
both levels of an urban context would provide all potential scenarios and users with
information that would direct them to care locations. In addition to directing possible
victims on foot, wayfinding should be located so that those in vehicles can also obtain
direction.

Information displayed to potential victims would identify the location of activated
healthcare facilities or alternate care locations within proximity to the self-triage kiosk.
Wayfinding would provide a type of mapping, and visual queue for patients, establishing
opportunities for them to be directed to care locations assigned by their self-triage
diagnosis during an event during which they may be overwhelmed with unnerving
emotions. All wayfinding components would not be utilized at once; patients shouldn’t
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be directed to contexts (alternative or conventional healthcare settings) that are not
activated. Wayfinding is established through a minimal architectural interjection capable
of being used on a latent basis (to convey public health information, or information
regarding events throughout the city). Digital signage located above ground would
have the ability to be powered by solar panels, similar to the way in which many street
lamps function today. This would therefore allow the continuous operation if the power
Figure 75, Digital Signage

grid was disrupted.

75. Personal Image

Wayfinding located within the metro system would occur through the adaptation
of information displayed on existing digital signage (Figure 67) located at the train
platforms. As previously noted, this signage would also be used to convey public
health information. The adaptation of existing signage would occur through the use
of integrated technology with an established connection to the network. The remote
network of emergency responders would determine the need for metro (trains) to be
used as a type of medical transport. When not commandeered by response authorities
specifically for medical transport, it can be assumed that less critical victims or those
who can be served at an alternative care location would be appropriately directed to
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designated trains and buses to travel between their individual triage and the location
where they will be treated depending on their need for isolation from the general public.
Critical victims would presumably need medical assistance and may need to rely more
heavily on emergency responders. Those victims independently moving toward care
locations would need signage on the street to direct them from the metro stop to the
appropriate setting to receive care.

Wayfinding that occurs at the street level would be critical during an event in which the
underground metro system was the targeted site and potential victims could not rely on
Metro trains for transportation. When the metro system is unable to act as a component
of the response network, the bus system would be utilized instead. Wayfinding is
equally as important during this type of scenario due to the fact that more people will
be traveling by foot and will need the assistance of (digital) signage at street level that
would provide direction.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL
Study Area

Through the utilization of the existing mass transportation network and it’s supporting
elements, this proposal for a systemic and architectural response to bioterrorism in
Washington, D.C. will focus primarily on the identification and development of
architectural and programmatic interventions including public health displays,
independent triage terminals, and wayfinding elements. Dispersed throughout the mass
transit system, these interventions are designed to supplement existing resources and
Figure 76, Metro Iconographic Signage
76. Personal Image

to provide the walking well with services that they would typically seek at a traditional
healthcare setting therefore reducing the potential for non-critical victims during an
event to inundate typical care environments.

The transit network, specifically the metro rail system (Figure 76, Figure 77) in
Washington D.C. is an icon and has established nodal conditions throughout the D.C.
area. As a result of the conditions for which they are designed, public mass transportation
systems have the ability to handle the ebb and flow of large masses of people; these
types of systems are also capable of managing changing passenger flow during peak
hours. Increased numbers and more frequent trains can accommodate a larger number
Figure 77, DC Metro System Map
77. Personal Image

of customers during rush hour, as well as the ability to change the flow of turnstiles
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to meet the demands of riders entering and exiting stations. For example, during rush
hour in order to meet the demands of the flow, stations at the end of a rail line convert
the majority of their ticketing turnstiles to allow more riders to exit a station than enter;
the opposite condition would occur at these stations in the morning rush hour. During
an event it is critical to be able to adapt a response context based on the demands of
both predicted and unpredictable victim flow.

Distributing a response to meet the needs of the primary victim typology, the walking
well, throughout an urban context alleviates the potential for these patients to seek
unnecessary care at traditional healthcare settings. The metro system has the ability
to function independently as a type of response without immediate assistance from an
emergency responder. This component of the transit system however would need to be
controlled from a hierarchical remote point of response at the communication center
defined previously within this thesis. Utilizing an existing system during a response to
bioterrorism that is capable of handing large numbers of people on a daily basis allows
the focus of the healthcare provider to center around critical and non-critical victims
rather than having to focus on managing and filtering the needs of the walking well.
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Metro Station Typology: Metro stations located throughout D.C. commonly have two
basic configurations that are defined by their entrance location—a corner condition or
storefront condition of a building façade that is open at grade to the sidewalk (Figure
78) or within an open plaza area (Figure 79). Typically, when a building façade entry
occurs, there is a limited covered space where response interventions and efforts can
take place due the minimal sidewalk space. Open plaza conditions are more spacious
Figure 78, Corner Condition Entry
78. Personal Image

and allow for a more generous opportunity for response; however, there are not many
of these entrances throughout the network.

The progression of a rider through a Metro station occurs at three basic levels—entry,
ticketing and platform. At each of these levels an architectural interjection is proposed
as a model of response during a bioterrorist event. As a victim progresses through the
metro station during an event the programmatic response present, such as individual
triage, is tailored to the symptoms related to the type of agent used during an attack. This
type of filtering should occur so that actual patients are directed to appropriate healthcare
Figure 79, Plaza Condition
79. Personal Image

or alternative care location, and ultimately so that the walking well do not disrupt the
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ability of responders to provide care for those in need of medical treatment.

At the (street) entry level, this thesis proposes that public health display elements be
integrated into the fabric of the metro station and serve both an everyday latent as well
as an activated function during an event. Also at the entry level, the initial point of
independent triage would occur and include thermal scans. It is necessary to provide
both of these architectural and programmatic interjections at the entry level so that the
Figure 80, Ticketing Terminals
80. Personal Image

walking well are given the opportunity to determine whether or not they have symptoms
and need to seek further treatment to prevent them from inundating a metro station.

Ticketing areas typically include multiple independent ticketing machines (Figure 80),
a station operator kiosk (with a metro employee present) and turnstiles that allow riders
to progress to the platform levels. (Figure 81) This thesis proposes that the second
stage of independent triage, self-diagnosis takes place at this level through the adaptive
reuse of ticketing terminals. The number of ticketing points available within a Metro
station depends on daily utilization as well as the number of rail lines that are present
Figure 81, Metro Ticketing and Entry Turnstiles
81. Personal Image

within a station. This thesis assumes that the existing number of terminals will be
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adequate during a response effort. Information technologies are already in place with
existing metro stations; during an event a proposed response (such as self-triage) would
piggy-back on to those components (by converting internal software systems). In case
of an event, the existing metro system components and functions (such as the ticketing
terminals) would be overridden and controlled by the network control center. Once a
potential victim has completed the self-diagnosis process they would receive a ticket
Figure 82, Entry Turnstiles
82. Personal Image

with their information and diagnosis. The ticket would not only have a summary of
their assessment but a specific treatment location would be identified so that the victim
would know where to seek further care. The machines used for this process would be
modified versions of the ticketing machines currently used in the metro and would be
able to issue regular metro tickets during normal conditions.

Likewise the turnstiles (Figure 82) that allow entry into the metro system would also be
replaced with adapted versions that serve both a daily function and a modified function
during a terrorist event. Entry turnstiles are a controlled component and the number
of them in any given station is based on the size of the station. The direction in which
people can use them varies pending on the time of day and the demands of the flow of
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traffic. This thesis will assume that an adequate number of turnstiles needed to handle
the volume of people are provided. Under event response conditions after a victim has
been assessed at the modified ticketing machines they would insert their ticket into the
turnstile tickets to enter--only patients that need additional medical care would be able
to enter into the metro system. This process helps to prevent the walking well (who do
not require further medical attention) from entering into the metro system. Only those
victims with an appropriate diagnosis could proceed into the metro and use the adapted
Figure 83, Platform Signage
83. Personal Image

system accordingly.

Once at the platform level, riders are directed to their trains through the use of digital
signage. (Figure 83) During a response effort, station signage would be converted
to provide wayfinding and public health information—for example it would inform
identified victims of the platform that they need to be at in order to travel to a particular
healthcare facility or alternative care location.

This signage would specifically

convey information about which healthcare facilities and alternate care locations are
activated, where they are located and what trains would be servicing those locations.
Correspondingly, once a victim has arrived at the (destination) station serving their
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respective healthcare facility or alternative care site, appropriate stations signs would
also be activated to provide wayfinding from the platform to their destination. At the
platform level thermal scans could be activated only during instances where patients
exiting trains were believed to have been exposed to an agent; during all other cases
public health information and wayfinding would be the primary means of response at
the platform level.
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Figure 85, Concentrated Event Study Areas
85. Personal Image
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Scenario Proposals and Response

Two potential events located within the urban threat context of Washington D.C. are
illustrated in an effort to demonstrate the capability of both the systemic and specific
architectural features proposed in this thesis. Two of the greatest potential events
include chemical and biological attacks. (Figure 84, and Figure 85) The events include:
‘a chemical attack on the National Mall’ and ‘anthrax released at RFK.’ Each event
Figure 84, Concentrated Event Study Areas
within the Context of Washington, D.C.
84. Personal Image

varies in the type of incident, scenario, and context therefore evaluation a range of
potential variables and their impact on a response. Both types of events will involve
a large number of victims, however the timelines differ. A chemical event lasts for a
matter of a few days whereas a biological event lasts for weeks. The events chosen
to evaluate illustrate the range of potential variables that an architectural and systemic
response will have to help manage during and following an act of bioterrorism.
Each event scenario attempts to illustrate the full capability of a response during
both chemical and biological attacks. The events studied are examples of worst case
scenarios; therefore any response that is capable of meeting the needs of the chosen
events is capable of responding to events of bioterrorism with lower impact.
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This thesis studied the overall metro area of Washington, D.C. however a systemic
response was evaluated within a more specific study area located centrally around
each event. The study area was determined by identifying an adequate number of
healthcare facilities, and alternative care locations needed to handle the load of patients
predicted for each event. The study area also took into consideration the distribution of
the activated response elements located within and near the metro rail and emergency
routes within the city. The study area serves as a model of response that can also be
Figure 86, Epicenter for Chemical Attack
Scenario: National Gallery of Art the National
Mall
86. Personal Image

applied to the entire urban threat context of Washington, D.C.

Event Scenario 1, A chemical attack on the National Mall: The first event study, a
chemical release on the National Mall, takes place in front of the National Gallery of
Art (Figure 86) and evaluates an architectural and systemic response to the impact
of a chemical event. (Figure 87) The National Mall consists of many museums and
monuments that line along a wide-open space and a highly populated area with tourists,
a potential target of a terrorist attack. (Figure 78, Figure 79) Located at the end of the
axis of this open space is the Capitol Building, also known as Capitol Hill, a highly
significant building that houses many federal government functions as well as significant
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Figure 87, Concentrated Chemical Study Area and Surrounding Landmarks
87. Personal Image
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representatives of the United States Legislature. The White House is also within close
proximity to the National Mall. The surrounding urban infrastructure of the National
Mall is a considerably high threat area based on the premise that terrorists will target
densely populated, high profile areas within an urban context. A response effort that
occurs on the National Mall is a unique but probable scenario based on the availability
of large open spaces within an urban context.

Although this attack takes place in an outdoor setting, a relatively small number of
potential victims is exposed—150 people, of which 50 are diagnosed in critical condition.
The response context is primarily located at the event epicenter with the assistance of
existing resources—the National Metropolitan Response Team (NMRT). This event
spans a timeline of three days. The epicenter serves as the response context where
NMRT responds and provides decontamination. Despite efforts make at the epicenter
many potential victims move outside the containment area before it is established.
Therefore activated responses including the display of public health information, and
self-diagnosis to potential victims who have dispersed throughout the urban context are
activated throughout the broader context of the metro system; the primary delivery of
care however is decontamination at the epicenter.
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A response must provide the walking well with information about the event and the
agent that has been released so that they can determine whether or not they have been
exposed. Systemically during this event the transit network is adapted and used to
transport victims who have dispersed throughout the context so that they can return
back to the epicenter where they will receive decontamination and further evaluation
from medical responders. The immediate recognition and awareness of a chemical
agent conveyed in this event scenario allows for an immediate response strategy.

Sequence of Events during a Chemical Attack on the National Mall: At 9:10 in
the morning tourists are beginning to arrive at museums along the National Mall.
Federal employees are walking and driving near the Mall to get to their offices. At
a nearby metro station commuters are exiting onto the Mall. The National Mall is
moderately populated with a wide variety of people—all potential targets of terrorism.
An indiscrete, empty bus is parked on a street lining the Mall. (Figure 80) Without
warning, a chemical bomb planted within the bus explodes spreading mustard gas
throughout the immediate context. One hundred and fifty people within the epicenter
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are infected; fifty of them are critically injured. The chemical agent is immediately
detected by a monitoring device located within close proximity to the epicenter (on the
Mall.) Emergency officials immediately confirm the chemical agent, and emergency
responders within close proximity are dispatched to the epicenter. NMRT, located less
than ten minutes away in Arlington, Virginia is sent to the site in order to provide mass
decontamination. George Washington University Hospital in notified of the attack and
Figure 88, Empty Bus Houses the Chemical
Bomb on the National Mall
88. Personal Image

immediately begins to prepare for the influx of victims.

During the end of the first day, during the timeline of the event, the majority of actual
victims have been identified and treated at the decontamination site administered by
NMRT. (Figure 89) In order to prevent the walking well from inundating NMRT at
the epicenter, metro stations throughout DC remain activated to provide public health
information. Thermal scans within close proximity to the epicenter remain activated
and on average an additional one-hundred fifty potential victims are performing thermal
scans per hour, although none show a positive result. Metro lines remain closed allowing
exposed, non-critical victims the opportunity to utilize the response network—including

Figure 89, Chemical Attack, Epicenter, Location
for NMRT to provide Decontamination
89. Personal Image

thermal scans, public health information and self-diagnosis if necessary. The lines
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remain closed to the public to prevent additional people from entering the epicenter and
overwhelming responding healthcare facilities. The local bus system supplements the
conventional metro system by providing additional buses along the same route that the
metro would be operating, allowing commuters throughout the city to continue normal
movement through and out of the city. During rush hour, the bus lines remain active to
provide transit along the full length of metro lines, allowing commuters who normally
rely on the metro rail to leave the city.

The number of non-critical victims presenting themselves for decontamination is low,
and almost non-existent. At the end of the response effort, the network control center is
no longer necessary to collaborate response efforts; it is deactivated. All response sites
and systems that had been activated throughout the metro stations are also deactivated.
NMRT begins to breakdown their equipment and discontinue services, as all infected
patients have been identified and treated. Post-event, the Environmental Protection
Agency begins to clean-up the epicenter as well as evaluate and clean-up the area
surrounding the epicenter. Part of the clean-up process includes destroying activated
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elements such as thermal scans. Understanding that the majority of critical patients will
be treated at the epicenter, it is still a viable assumption that thermal scans (for example)
may be exposed to a chemical agent through contaminated victims. Additionally,
the proposed materials that are used to construct thermal scans may not be able to
function as needed during future events after being decontaminated. Therefore they are
removed, and replaced post-event. Ultimately, metro stations are reopened to riders,
after sensors within the Metro and surrounding areas deem the air quality safe and noncontaminated.
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Non-critical but exposed victims begin
to disperse throughout the urban context and away from the immediate
epicenter.
Emergency response arrives at the National Mall and begins to treat critical
victims at the epicenter. Emergency
responders transfer non-critical victims
to a location downwind of the epicenter
where treatment will occur.

Figure 90, Victim Dispersion
90. Personal Image

Post release of mustard gas, because of the fact that the agent is odorless, victims within proximity to the event who believe that they were far enough away
from the explosion and are therefore not infected, begin to disperse throughout
D.C.
Figure 91, Victim Flow
91. Personal Image
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9:15 a.m.
Communication Network activated at a
hospital outside the range of impact
Metro rail lines shut down to prevent riders from exiting and dispersing throughout the urban context. Trains along the
red, orange and blue lines that recently
passed through the Mall area L’Enfant
station plus the Smithsonian Metro
Station are evacuated so that potential
victims can exit at the Metro Station and
perform individual thermal scans; public
health information is displayed at the
platform level.

(Metro) Orange Line

(Metro) Red Line

Activated Metro Stops
(Metro) Blue Line

Metro Center

Federal Triangle

Archives/Navy Memorial

Epicenter
Smithsonian

Oncoming trains are stopped before
reaching the Smithsonian Metro Station,
as well as surrounding metro stations,
preventing people from dispersing into
the epicenter.

L’Enfant Plaza

Metro Center, Smithsonian, Federal Triangle, Archives/Navy Memorial and L’Enfant
Plaza—metro stations with potentially infected patients that could have dispersed
activate thermochromic surfaces and self-diagnosis stations as well as public health
display elements that informs potential victims of their possible exposure.
Figure 92, Activated Metro Stations
92. Personal Image
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9:20 a.m.
Emergency response dispatched to assist
within the metro system at stations where
trains are evacuated.
Responders and metro employees within
stations assist victims, and redirect the
walking well; digit signage also conveys
information as to how to exit the metro
station.
Riders including acutely exposed victims
and the walking well, waiting on the
platform at stations within proximity to
the Mall are evacuated from the metro
station; after all metro trains have been
evacuated rail lines are closed and are
dedicated only to be used for emergency
response transportation.
Potentially infected riders waiting on the
platform self-test themselves (to confirm
exposure) by interacting with thermal
scans to determine whether or not infected.
The ticketing system is converted to
allow patients who received a positive
diagnosis from the thermal scans to
perform a further, more in depth self-diagnosis.

Thermal scans are activated at the platform level to provide an instant diagnosis for
potentially infected victims forced to evacuate trains that would have been in proximity to the National Mall during the attack.

Figure 93, Activated Thermal Scans
93. Personal Image

169

9:25 a.m.
NMRT arrives at the epicenter to set up a
mass decontamination unit.
9:30 a.m.
Citical victims from the epicenter transfered to George Washington University
Hospital
9:35 a.m.
Media coverage begins in collaboration
with the Communication Network begins.
Throughout the city announcements and
alerts are sent to advise the public of the
situation.
The communication network relays information to the public, in particular where
the walking well and non-critical victims
can receive care.

Displays at metro stations within close proximity to the epicenter as well as those
dispersed throughout the city are activated to inform the public that an attack has
taken placed and necessary precautions should be taken by the public domain as a
whole.
Figure 94, Activated Public Health Information
94. Personal Image
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9:45 a.m.
Non-critical victims begin decontamination administered by NMRT at the
epicenter.
Evacuated victims at metro stations
receive further diagnosis of exposure if
thermal scan indicated exposure to agent.
Non-contaminated commuters, those
who received negative results from the
thermal scan are evacuated from station.

Thermal scans are activated at street level providing diagnosis for potential victims
throughout the city.
Figure 95, Activated Thermal Scans at Street Level
95. Personal Image
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10:00 a.m.
Victims in need of further care and decontamination transported to decontamination site near epicenter via the orange
line of the Metro rail.

(Metro) Red Line
(Metro) Blue Line

(Metro) Orange Line

10:05 a.m.
Entry to the metro reopened, although
the red and blue lines remain closed to
provide transportation to alternative care
locations.

Upwind location from
Epicenter

Public health information displayed at
Smithsonian Metro entrance.
Large amount of walking well present
themselves due to their proximity to the
epicenter.

Epicenter
NMRT
Smithsonian Metro

10:30 a.m.
At epicenter all critical victims have
been transported to a healthcare facility.
Treatment at the epicenter is focused on
the walking well and non-critical victims.
Hazmat teams, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) evaluate
the extent of the release and the intensity
of the clean-up.

At the epicenter, decontamination is set up to provide care to non-critical, infected
victims. Victims are transferred from self-diagnosis sites located within the metro
station via the metro line to the context in which care is being delivered by NMRT.

Figure 96, Infected Patients Transported
96. Personal Image
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10:35 a.m.
Hazmat teams, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) evaluate
the extent of the release and the intensity
of the clean-up.
Areas upwind of epicenter are evaluated
to further understand the breadth of area
the agent traveled. (Figure 97)

Orange Metro Line
Utilized for
Patient Transport
Activated Metro
Stations/Lines and Care
Settings

George Washington
Hospital

Majority of known victims have been
decontaminated.
Law enforcement assists the NMRT in
crowd control.
11:00 a.m.
Remaining Metro Stations activated
throughout the city.

Epicenter
NMRT
Smithsonian Metro

150+/- riders/pedestrians are receiving
thermal scans an hour.
1-2 new victims are diagnosed and transported to the Smithsonian Metro Station
where they are transported to George Washington Hospital. The number of infected
victims remains constant throughout the city over a 24 hour period. The majority of
victims however do not return a positive thermal scan.

Figure 97, Infected Patients Diagnosed
97. Personal Image
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11:00 a.m. (Cont’d)
Emergency vehicular routes throughout
the city are not inundated with exiting
employees/residents.
The communication network and media
continue to provide coverage and alerts.

Alternativ
Routes
Bus Route
establishe

George Washington
Hospital

The major form of communication is
through the communication network
(located in MD).
Non-critical patients have been decontaminated by NMRT.
Walking well - required to proceed
through thermal scans, before decontamination is administered; few patients need
decontamination.

Epicenter
NMRT
Smithsonian Metro

Metro lines remain closed; traditional
NMRT riders forced to use other transportation systems
supplemented by the metro bus system that creates new (temporary) lines along traditional metro routes.
Figure 98, Alternative Transportation
98. Personal Image
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12:00 p.m.
Thermal scan use at the entry level increases as the number of people/employees increases during the lunch hour.
Public health information intensifies.
No victims needing decontamination are
detected within the system.
2:00 p.m.
Communication network staff and EPA
decide to re-open Metro lines.
Pneumatic barriers located at entry gates
are removed, destroyed and replaced by
trained metro engineers.
Entry to the Metro stations is reopened.

Pneumatic Barriers

Figure 99, Pneumatic Barriers activated at Street Level
99. Personal Image
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3:00 p.m.
The majority of self-triage units converted back to latent function of ticketing.
Few remain open as self-diagnosis and
public health information.
Thermal scans still deployed at entry
level.
4:00 p.m.
Due to the impact on the Metro system,
metro buses continue to run along the
Metro line routes so that normal metro
riders are transported out of city during
rush hour.
NMRT remains deployed on the mall
throughout the night – several remaining
infected patients receive decontamination

Figure 100, Self Diagnosis Activated
100. Personal Image
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Figure 101, Metro Stations Reopened
101. Personal Image

Day 2
9:00 a.m.
EPA begins initial clean-up of the epicenter, as well as local metro station.

Day 3
9:00 a.m.
NMRT breaks down decontamination
site.

The number of people continuing to present as infected is low, and almost non-existent.

Epicenter clean up begins.

1:00 p.m.
Communication center officials and the
EPA decide that thermal scans can be
deactivated.
Thermal scans within the outer limits of
the district are removed, destroyed, and
replaced by trained metro engineers.
6:00 p.m.
Remaining thermal scans within close
proximity to the epicenter are removed,
destroyed, and replaced by trained metro
engineers.

Public health officials continues to provide information about the clean-up of
the agent.
Clean-up and monitoring of the epicenter
as well as localized Metro stations begins
and continues for several days.
Riders are permitted within the Metro
system; sensors within Metro deem air
quality safe.
Trains used for transportation during
event are studied and evaluated for possible contamination.
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Architectural Conclusion, A Chemical Attack on the National Mall: This chemical
event scenario demonstrates the ability of an architectural and systemic response to
activate immediately and serve a high number of potential victims within a concentrated
area and brief amount of time. During a chemical attack it is significant to consider
existing resources that may be able to handle the load of a mass decontamination
facility. In this instance, a mobile response team, the NMRT, was capable of providing
this program response. Part of the success in enabling their response is the fact that
they, unlike many mobile response models are able to be self sustaining without having
to ‘plug into’ external resources. NMRT provides their own water and electrical
resources. The ability to set up and provide care regardless of sources such as water,
and electricity make NMRT a more flexible form of mobile response; however it can be
assumed that most typologies of mobile response will need to be able to utilize existing
sources of water and electricity. The location of this event enables the metro to play
a significant role during the response, in particular dealing with the task of informing
the public. It is reasonable to believe that the proposed systematic and architectural
interventions were capable of responding to the immediate needs of a response during
a mid-size chemical attack located within a densely populated, potential urban threat
context.
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Event Scenario 2, Anthrax released at RFK: Event two, anthrax released at RFK,
is not only located within the stadium, but also the residential context that surrounds
it. (Figure 102, Figure 103) During the event populated by 50,000 attendees, a truck
driving upwind of the stadium releases anthrax into the air infecting 10,000 fans and
3,000 residents. Post event, fans disperse throughout the metropolitan area unnoticed.
Several days after the initial release, patients begin to show up at local emergency
Figure 102, Concentrated Biological Event Study
Area within context of Washington D.C.
102. Personal Image

departments with symptoms similar to the flu. Five days after the initial release
anthrax poisioning is recognized (in part due to the increasing number of patients with
similar symptoms.) This event spans for twelve days, a much longer period of time
than the chemical event studied. The primary architectural response during this event
is self-diagnosis. The primary treatment needed is immunization located at multiple
sites within the alternative care network. This event involves prolonged times and the
potentially high number of victims (including the walking well) who will need diagnosis
and treatment. A response must be capable of responding immediately, but it must also
be capable of prolonging its activated function for a prolonger period of time.
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During the remaining duration of response, the network control center, particularly
the media component, continues to provide widespread coverage throughout the
metropolitan area. Public health information continues to be updated at activated
public health terminals throughout the metro system. Residents within close proximity
to the stadium in particular are advised to seek further care, and are administered
antibiotics. Additional alternative care locations, such as the DC Armory adjacent
to RFK, is activated. The Armory is located within proximity to the metro transit
system providing access for potential victims. This facility would be activated as
an alternative care locating providing minor care and (potential) vaccination to noncritical victims. The large size of this facility would be capable of compensating for
the influx of patients within the metro area, including Maryland and Virginia (as well
as the District of Columbia).

As the awareness of the event increases, the number of activated thermal scans and
self-diagnosis terminals amplifies within the metro system to provide care for the
walking well. Despite the increase in non-critical patients seeking care at alternative
care locations, antibiotics are still available and continue to be distributed throughout
the city.
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By the end of the seventh day of the response, patient flow decreases, and alternative care
locations begin to deactivate. Additionally thermal scans and self-diagnosis terminals
no longer in demand by the walking well are deactivated so that their latent function
can be restored. Post-event decontamination of the self-triage kiosks and thermal scans
must occur due to the large number of patient typologies that have come in contact with
the proposed architectural interventions. Additionally it can be assumed that during
the post-event timeline the reinstallment of architectural interjections utilized during
the response would occur so that the threat context is prepared for future response
efforts. For example self-diagnosis terminals would be decontaminated, and converted
(internally) to their latent function of ticketing. Thermal scans would be deactivated
and reinstalled to their latent position in preparation for a future response effort. Only
a few larger alternative care locations, such as the DC Armory, Convention Center
and Verizon Center Arena remain active. (Figure 111) Both facilities are larger and
capable of handling the remaining victim load. Throughout the metro system, cleanup
administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) occurs; this is the same
process that would occur after a chemical event. This would involve the process of
cleaning and decontaminating response locations to ensure that the agent has been

181

eradicated and is no longer a threat to the public. It is important to perform a clean-up
process so that the public is ensured of their safety. Post clean-up metro stations would
return to their daily, latent capabilities.

The overall cleanup and decontamination of

the metro system and alternative care locations lasts for five days, making the total
duration of response to a biological agent twelve days.
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Biological Attack
Study Area

Figure 104, Box Truck

Surrounding
Residential
Area

104. Personal Image

An event at RFK stadium becomes
infected as a truck driving upwind of the
stadium releases aerosolized anthrax into
the environment.

Chemical Attack
Study Area

10,000 fans and 3,000 residents are exposed to the agent.
10:30
Post game, fans disperse throughout the
metropolitan area, including Washington,
D.C., Virginia, and Maryland.

Figure 103, Concentrated biological event study area
103. Personal Image

RFK
Stadium
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Day 2
Biological agent unconfirmed.
People exposed at the game, or within
proximity to RFK during the time of
release move about the region without
knowing that they have been exposed.
public health information.
Thermal scans still deployed at entry
level.
4:00 p.m.
Due to the impact on the Metro system,
metro buses continue to run along the
Metro line routes so that normal metro
riders are transported out of city during
rush hour.
NMRT remains deployed on the mall
throughout the night – several remaining
infected patients receive decontamination.
Day 3, Morning
3,000 patients become symptomatic;
1,200 with flu like symptoms go to local
hospitals.

Figure 105, Biological Attack Epicenter and Surrounding Metro Area
105. Personal Image
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Day 3 (cont’d)
Increase in patient flow considered a
possible increase in influenza exposure;
anthrax not considered. 59 people die as
a result of exposure to anthrax.
Evening
Anthrax confirmed and linked to the
deaths that took place throughout the day.
6:00 p.m.
The communication command center—
established outside of the urban threat
context in Maryland, conveys public
health information such as signs of exposure, self-triage locations and activated
alternative care locations, throughout the
metro system, and through media resources. Care locations are activated.
Thermal scans activated at Metro station
entry points.Ticketing systems converted
to provide further self diagnosis. Healthcare facilities are activated and begin
treating critical patients; Alternative
care locations begin to serve non-critical
patients.

Figure 106, Activated Care Locations
106. Personal Image
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7:00 p.m.
The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and HAZMAT teams investigate
the exposure and remains of agent at the
epicenter (RFK stadium). Event attendance studied by healthcare officials
representated within the communication
network to evaluate spread of disease.
The Centers for Disease Control [CDC]
contacted; vaccines processed and released to Washington D.C. area hospitals
and alternative care locations.

Activated Healthcare
Facilities
(RFK Stadium) Epicenter

Proposed Alternative Care Network
within Washington DC

Activated Alternative Care
Locations (Schools)

8:00 p.m.
The proposed alternate care network,
such as schools, and larger convention
centers and arenas, within Washington
DC are staffed and begin to set up, in
anticipation for the predicted patient flow
beginning the next day.
Day 4
Morning
Alternate locations primarily schools
within the immediate threat context are
activated for immunization of non-critical patients.

(RFK Stadium) Epicenter

Immediate Threat Context

Figure 107, Biological Event Epicenter

107. Personal Image
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5:00 p.m.
The network of alternative care locations
throughout the urban context remain the
primary points of care served by public
health officials, and clinical staff. However, medical staff remains primarily at
activated hospitals to provide care for
critical patients.
Metro trains run on limited tracks (Red
and Orange Lines) that have been converted to provide transportation of
infected patients to healthcare facilities,
and well as less critical patients to alternative care locations.
Bus Routes are converted to transport
patients to healthcare facilities from activated metro stations (on the orange and
red line).

Washington Hospital Center
Activated Bus Line Utilized to
Transport Patients to
Healthcare Facilities
Howard University Hospital
Wayfinding Routes to Alternative
Care Locations
Activated (Red) Metro Line
Utilized to Transport Patients
to Healthcare Facilities and
Alternative Care Locations

Activated Alternative Care

Activated (Red Line) Metro Stations

Activated Vehicular Routes

Wayfinding routes-both vehicular and
walking are activated from metro stations
to the activated alternative care locations.

Activated (Orange) Metro Line
Activated (Orange Line) Metro Stations

Figure 108, Alternative Transportation
108. Personal Image
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Day 5-6 Continues
Morning
Metro trains run on limited tracks, as
some metro rail lines are converted to
provide transportation of infected patients to healthcare facilities (Washington
Hospital Center and Howard University
Hospital), and well as less critical patients to alternative care locations.
Thermal Scans are activated at Metro
Stations

Washington Hospital Center
(critical patients)

Howard University Hospital
(critical patients)

Activated (Orange) Metro Line
Activated (Red) Metro Line
Activated Bus Line
Thermal Scans
(walking well)
Activated (Red and Orange
Line) Metro Stations
(critical and non-critical patients)
Activated Alternative Care
(non critical patients)
Activated Vehicular Routes
Wayfinding Routes to Alternative
Care Locations

Figure 109, Adapted Metro Lines
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Day 5-6 Continues
Morning Cont’d
1,300 Patients confirmed ill, treated at
hospitals throughout urban context.
2,000 walking well utilize thermal scans
(Figure 98) throughout the morning rush
hour at metro stations. 1,500 produce
negative results and progress to self-diagnosis stations to further assess their
state of health. The majority of these
patients are confirmed to need further
treatment or immunization and present
themselves at alternate care locations.

Epicenter + Area
of Dispersion

Activated Healthcare
Facilities

Activated Alternative
Care Locations

100 Critical Patients

100 Critical Patients

Figure 110, Patient Population & Dispersion
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Architectural Conclusion: Anthrax Released at RFK:
This biological event scenario demonstrates the scope and nature of a response on a
widely dispersed level throughout the entire urban context and how it might serve a
potentially high number of walking well over a prolonged amount of time. During
a biological attack it is significant to consider existing resources and alternative care
locations that would be able to handle the load of the walking well and non-critical
patients.

The length of time between the release of a biological agent and recognition can be a
matter of days, unlike the immediate awareness of a chemical response. Between the
initial release and recognition, victims have dispersed and cannot be as easily contained
and treated. Providing public health information, and opportunities for self diagnosis,
including thermal scans and self-diagnosis terminals at a dispersed level throughout
an urban context provides the opportunity for potential victims and the walking well
who have dispersed from the initial epicenter to determine whether or not they have
been exposed. Healthcare facilities are able to handle the load of victims who are
critically ill because their numbers are significantly less than non-critical patients. A
greater number of walking well will inherently be generated because of the delay in
recognition, and therefore a response will rely heavily on establishing alternative care

190

locations for this patient typology.
Verizon Center

Architectural Conclusion for Overall Scenario Proposals and Response:

Two

potential events located within the urban threat context of Washington D.C. were
illustrated in an effort to demonstrate the capability of both the systemic and specific
DC Armory

architectural features proposed in this thesis. Although each event varied in the type
of incident, scenario, and context the intent of this evaluation was to study a differing

Figure 111, Remaining Active Care Locations
111. Personal Image

potential variables and their impact on a response. Each type of event involved a
respectively significant number of victims; however the timelines differed greatly—
from an immediate, short response to a delayed, prolonged response.

Each event scenario illustrates the potential capability of a response during both
chemical and biological attacks. The events studied were examples of typical event
scenarios; therefore any response capable of meeting the needs of these hypothestical
events could reasonably be expected to respond to potentially less significant events of
bioterrorism.
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This thesis studied the ability to utilize existing resources throughout the area of
Washington, D.C. including the metro transit system and existing infrastructure. Given
that an act of bioterrorism is a low probability, high consequence event, a response
must utilize existing multi-purpose resources in order to be cost effective and efficient.
Similarly, a response must be dispersed to meet the unpredictable demands and location
of an event epicenter within potential urban threat contexts. These events demonstrated
that responses must be flexible to meet the demands of patient flow during an event.
Existing healthcare facilities have the ability to handle the predicted number of critical
victims in particular since these victims will be in the minority during a response effort.
The most significant need identified throughout this exercise is the ability to serve
the walking well at a distributed level throughout a context so that they are directed
appropriately away from traditional healthcare facilities.

Further studies regarding an act of bioterrorism may explore the ability of a response
effort to react to multiple events within a single urban context. If more than one event
were to occur at once, how would a response effort react, and would there be sufficient
resources to handle this type of threat? Another event study may examine the possibility
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of an urban threat context being evacuated. This type of event would examine the
capability of the proposed architectural interjections to respond appropriately—if
potential patients are forced to evacuate the threat context, how do dispersed elements,
such as thermal scans, and self-diagnosis terminals provide an appropriate response?
It can be assumed however that this type of event would demonstrate the need for a
response to occur at a distributed level outside of the defined urban threat context.

This thesis has focused on a significant, and traditionally unaddressed population
that has the ability to present themselves in great numbers—the walking well. This
population has the ability to cripple existing healthcare facilities that would otherwise
be capable of handling most event scenarios. Any response to an act of bioterrorism
must be able to address this population at a highly dispersed level throughout a threat
context.
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